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1 This document summarizes some of the results of the project entitled “MODELO DE 
EQUILIBRIO GENERAL COMPUTABLE PARA ANALIZAR LOS IMPACTOS 
MACROECONÓMICOS  DEL PROCESO DE REFORMA DE LOS SERVICIOS 
PUBLICOS EN URUGUAY”, financed by OPP and World Bank, URU/01/010-028. Inés 
Terra coordinated the team that worked in this project, which was integrated by Pedro 
Barrenechea, Alvaro Forteza, Gabriel Katz, Héctor Pastori, Andrés Pereyra, Darío Saráchaga 
and Inés Terra. The authors of this document assume full responsibility for its contents. The 
bulk of the study was carried out in the second semester of 2002 and there have been some 
changes in the regulatory frame of public services since then. These changes are 
acknowledged in the discussion, but the simulations summarized here are the original ones. 
Nevertheless, we think that these simulations remain valid today.   
 
















This paper investigates the macroeconomic impacts of the reform of public services in 
Uruguay. A computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is used to simulate different policy 
scenarios, analyzing the reforms of the regulatory framework of public services, changes in 
their investment policies, modifications in the competitive environment and reforms in their 
tax structure. The results show that the macroeconomic effects of the proposed reforms are 






El presente trabajo analiza los impactos macroeconómicos de la reforma de los servicios 
públicos en Uruguay. A tales efectos utilizamos un modelo de equilibrio general computable 
(CGE) para simular distintos escenarios de política, tales como cambios en el marco 
regulatorio de los servicios públicos, cambios en sus políticas de inversión, modificaciones en 
su entorno competitivo y reformas en su estructura tarifaria. Los resultados obtenidos indican 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the late 1980s, after decades of poor economic management, many Latin American 
countries started a process of economic reform. Although the progress and scope of this 
process differed from country to country, its basic principles were similar, one of them being 
reliance on market forces to determine the allocation and distribution of resources. While 
Uruguay made considerable progress in achieving macroeconomic stability during the 1990s 
and embarked on a series of macroeconomic reforms, “…the country’s approach and pace of 
reform did not provide sufficiently prudent fiscal scope to absorb external shocks….nor 
insulate the economy from regional contagion” (World Bank, 2003).  
 
Following four years of economic stagnation, Uruguay faced in 2002 its most severe economic 
crisis in decades. In this context, international financial institutions provided Uruguay with 
technical and financial support in order to boost economic growth, improve the 
competitiveness of the Uruguayan economy and set the stage for recovery of sustained 
economic growth. Greater efficiency in the provision of public services and infrastructure was 
regarded by multilateral institutions as crucial for improving the general welfare of population 
and contributing toward the return to growth. Though some reforms in this area have already 
been undertaken and coverage and quality of the main public services in the country are high 
relative to the region, considerable challenges remain in further liberalizing key services and 
infrastructure sectors, strengthening regulatory frameworks, promoting private sector 
investment, reducing tax distortions and increasing competitiveness of service provision. The 
main goal of this paper is precisely to analyze the effects of the proposed reform of public 
services on the Uruguayan economy.  
 
II.   BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC SERVICES IN URUGUAY  
 
Although there are certain general characteristics underlying the provision of public services 
in Uruguay and a common logic in the regulatory reforms undertaken since the beginning of 
the nineties, each sector has its own defining characteristic. Moreover, these particular 
characteristics determined to a large extent the success or failure of the proposed reforms.  
 
In this section we give a brief overview of public services in Uruguay, underscoring the most 
salient features of the market organization and of the agents involved, the leading economic 
indicators of the sectors and the characteristics and objectives of the regulatory reforms 
implemented thus far.  
 
II.1  Railroad transportation sector 
 
The railroad transportation services were originally developed and supplied in Uruguay by 
British companies. In 1945 services were nationalized and became administered by the 
National Railroad Administration (AFE). Since then, this monopolistic public enterprise has 
been in charge of the infrastructure of railway network and of the provision of passenger and 
cargo transport services. In 1985 the passenger transport services were virtually interrupted 
and only some short - haul routes remained. In 1993 a concession for the exploitation of  4
suburban passenger transport services in Montevideo was established, but it was revoked in 
1996.  
 
In 2002, 822 thousands of tons of freight were transported, concentrated in few products and 
few routes, mainly in the countryside. The volume of cargo transported has been steadily 
decreasing since the year 2000. Except for some specific type of cargo with important 
volumes, railroad cargo transport cannot compete with truck traffic in view of the current 
financing conditions of the different modes of transportation. The most important foreseeable 
opportunity for railroad cargo transport in the near future lies in the development of the 
forestry sector, which will require the transport of big volumes of cargo in medium and long 
distances in the north of the country. Transport costs are key for this sector, therefore requiring 
important investments in transport as long as the institutional framework enables them.  
 
In regard to the participation of the private sector in the railway sector, there is the possibility 
to establish concession - type arrangements for the exploitation of transport services. This has 
already been done in the country, although results have not been very successful. Over the last 
couple of years there have been some attempts to introduce some reforms following the 
experiences in Great Britain and other developed countries. The intended effects of these 
reforms are to introduce competition in the railroad infrastructure market and to release AFE 
from infrastructure costs and enable it to compete reasonably in the railroad transport market. 
However, most of the reforms have not yet been implemented.  
 
A new government took office in March 2005. The authorities have announced a change in 
rail policies: the public administration will attempt joint ventures with private firms, rather 
than consession of public work (as the previous administration did).  
 
II. 2  Electric energy sector 
 
In the period 2001-2003, hydroelectric generation accounted for more than 95% of total 
electricity generated in the country. However, the availability of hydroelectric energy is highly 
variable and is not predictable with the prevailing techniques. In fact, in 2004, when demand 
rose and an important drought affected Uruguay, thermic generation reached 20% of total 
electrical generation.  
 
Uruguay’s electric system is linked with the Argentinean system through 500 kV transmission 
lines. Argentina’s availability of cheap natural gas and the size of its electrical generation 
system (which is 10 times the size of Uruguay’s system) have enabled Argentina to become an 
important energy exporter in the region. This close linkage with the Argentinean system would 
allow to entirely meeting Uruguay’s electrical demand with Argentinean energy, if it were not 
for the restrictions in the Argentinean transmission network.  
 
The electrical wholesale market in Argentina is going through a price crisis as a result of the 
emergency measures adopted by the Argentinean government in January 2002. The wholesale 
price in Argentina has plummeted following the “pesification” of the economy. This situation 
does not allow the development of the generation system in Argentina, and has led several 
firms to financial default. As a result, the investment in electricity in Argentina has basically  5
paralyzed. Therefore energy imports from Argentina are no longer safe, and there is a serious 
possibility that the Uruguayan demand is not fully covered.  
 
Furthermore, the Argentinean government modified the natural gas purchase agreements of 
Uruguayan agents, setting the prices in dollars (they were formerly in pesos). This constituted 
discriminative behavior in the regional gas market, raising the price of a crucial input for 
electric energy generation and hindering the possibility of an integrated and fair energy market 
for generators of both countries.  
 
Residential consumption accounts for the most part of electric energy consumption, mainly 
due to the use of electric energy in heating, water heating and cooking. Large industrial 
consumers represent less than 25% of the demand. Uruguayan demand remained relatively 
stable, which allowed the electric company to postpone some investment decisions for a while. 
But now the authorities are pressed to increase the generation capacity to reduce the risk of 
been unable to cover demand during peaks of high consumption of energy.  
 
The passing of the Law Nº 16.832 in 1997 and of other related resolutions in the following 
years implied a major regulatory reform in the electric energy sector. The law authorized 
potential competition in electric generation. On the other hand, the transmission and 
distribution of electricity remained public sector activities supplied by UTE, the monopolistic 
state enterprise. Besides, the law created an Electric Wholesale Market in which all local 
generators as well as bids from foreign suppliers compete.  
 
II. 3  Fuel sector 
 
The two main laws that regulate the functioning of the fuel market in Uruguay are Law Nº 
8.764 from 1931, that granted the public enterprise, ANCAP, monopoly rights on imports and 
exports of hydrocarbons and on oil refining, and Law Nº 17.448 from 2002, that established 
the demonopolization of imports, exports and refining of crude oil, allowing ANCAP to 
associate with private partners. Although the second law was partially derogated by a 
Referendum in 2003, it provided a new framework for introducing regulatory changes in the 
functioning of the fuel market.  
 
Since Uruguay does not produce fossil fuels, oil has to be imported. ANCAP’s prices and 
taxes are set by the Executive Power according to fiscal criteria, with no regard for efficiency 
considerations. This causes severe distortions in domestic prices in comparison to international 
prices (see Table 1). Tax incidence differs between oil derivatives, but it is quite relevant and 
represents an important source of incomes for the Uruguayan State (see Table 2).  
 
  6
Table 1 - Comparison of average import and domestic prices - 2002 













234 100% 438  1% 187% 
Gas  Oil  189 139% 304  67% 161% 
Fuel  Oil  158 122% 167  24% 106% 
Source: National Energy Office. 
 
 
Table 2 – Tax structure in the fuel market 
Taxes Super  gas  Gasoline 
 (Supra 95)  Gas Oil  Heavy Fuel Oil 
ANCAP  81% 48% 78% 81% 
Sales tax (IMESI)  0%  54%  22%  0% 
Value added tax 
(IVA)  19% 0%  0% 19% 
Source: Elaboration based on information provided by the National Energy Office for 2002. 
 
The distribution of liquid derivatives takes place in three modalities: direct sales from ANCAP 
to large consumers (those with monthly purchases bigger than 500 cubic meters); sales to 
intermediate consumers through four local distributors; and retail sales (gasoline and gas oil) 
through gas stations. There are four distributing firms in Uruguay: Esso, Shell, Texaco and 
DUCSA, the latter being a subsidiary firm of ANCAP. The three private distributors are linked 
to ANCAP through detailed contracts that establish the margins received by the distributors; 
the discounts offered to gas station owners and the transport costs. Besides, there are 550 gas 
stations, 10% of them owned by the distributors and the others owned by small firms linked to 
the distributors by long term contracts (10 to 15 years). The prevailing regulatory framework, 
incorporated in the contracts between ANCAP and the distributing firms and between them 
and gas station owners, determine that each derivative has the same price around the country. 
The contracts also regulate the number of permits for gas stations in the country, leading to 
reduced competition among distributors and enabling ANCAP to control the operative 
margins of each group of agents in the market.  
 
Since 1995, as part of a general association strategy with private partners, ANCAP has been 
seeking regional partners for the commercialization of fuel in order to adjust to potential 
competition in the domestic market. In 1998 ANCAP signed an agreement with the 
Argentinean distributor Sol Petróleo for the distribution in Argentina of automotive gasoline 
produced in one of ANCAP’s refineries. The agreement implied selling 220 thousands 
barrels/month, equivalent to 400 thousand cubic meters per year, an amount similar to the 
annual sales of automotive gasoline of ANCAP in the Uruguayan market.  
 
II. 4  Gas sector 
 
There is no natural gas production in Uruguay, so it has to be imported from Argentina. In 
1998, ANCAP and UTE signed an agreement with the Province of Entre Ríos (Argentina)  7
purchasing gas transport capacity in exchange for financial support to build a gas pipe in that 
Province. The agreement enabled the construction of a gas pipe in Entre Ríos that will allow 
transporting 2 to 4 million m3/day of gas to Uruguay. Besides, in March 1999 the Executive 
Power signed a concession contract for 30 years with Gaseoducto Cruz del Sur S.A., a 
consortium integrated by Pan American Energy, British Gas and Wintershall, whereby the 
firm was committed to build a central gas pipe joining Punta Lara (in the Argentinean coast), 
Colonia and Montevideo, and a series of other smaller gas pipes to supply cities in Colonia, 
San José and Canelones. However, this concession did not entirely solve the problem of 
transporting Argentinean gas to Montevideo, since the starting point of the gas pipe lies 30 km 
away from the existing gas network in Buenos Aires. 
 
Natural gas demand in the country comprises three different sectors: electric energy 
generation; large consumers, especially industrial ones, that could be connected to the 
distribution network in the near future and would use natural gas to substitute fuel oil, gas oil 
and wood; and residential consumers, whose connection to the distribution network will take 
longer due to economic reasons. The demand of the first sector will determine the economic 
feasibility of the construction of gas pipes in Uruguay. The industrial and residential demand 
will be much lower than the demand for electric energy generation, at least in the next 10 
years. 
 
II. 5  Telecommunications sector 
 
The National State Telephone Administration (ANTEL) was created in 1974 by Decree - Law 
Nº 14.235. ANTEL acted both as a telecommunications enterprise and a sectoral regulator, 
and its objectives included the provision of urban and long distance (national and 
international) telecommunication services, the provision and control of all activities related to 
public and private telecommunications, and the administration, defense and control of the 
national radioelectric space. The law granted ANTEL a monopolistic position regarding all its 
activities, though it only held exclusive rights to the provision of telephonic services. 
However, the interconnection to ANTEL’s telecommunication network, a crucial element for 
the existence of other operators in the market, requires the authorization of the public 
enterprise. Law Nº 16.211 introduced some regulatory changes, allowing ANTEL to integrate 
mixed (public - private) firms to provide telecommunication services. Although this law was 
derogated by a Referendum, some important articles related to the telecommunication sector 
remained unrevoked. Finally, the last Budget Law (Law Nº 17.296) maintained ANTEL’s 
monopolistic and exclusive rights to the provision of public basic telephonic services, while 
authorizing competition in other services. Articles 612 and 613 of the law, which provided the 
legal base for the liberalization of the sector, were derogated by a Referendum, thus 
endangering the development of the reform. Nonetheless, the Government was able to 
authorize several companies to operate in the international long distance and data transmission 
markets in 2001, and to organize an auction procedure to assign the use of the radioelectric 
space for mobile phone services that same year.  
 
Currently, local telephone services are monopolically provided by ANTEL. Until the end of 
2001, ANTEL also held a monopoly for the provision of international telephonic services. 
ANTEL’s tariffs were higher than those prevailing in the neighbor countries, and the firm 
obtained important revenues that determined gross benefits for the firm and transfers to the  8
General Government. Following the entry of new operators into the market, different service 
qualities and prices have appeared. However, competition has not yet developed completely 
because several entry barriers remain. These entry barriers prevent private operators of long 
distance and mobile telephony from accessing local nets with reasonable costs. 
Interconnection problems are directly related to difficulties in the regulatory process.  
 
The service that has experienced the greatest development in the last couple of years is mobile 
telephony. This service was originally provided in the country by MOVICOM, which was the 
only firm operating in the market between 1992 and 1994. Consumer prices were initially very 
high, therefore enabling MOVICOM to obtain important revenues and to finance network 
investments in just a few years despite having a reduced number of customers (less than 
6,000). In 1994 ANTEL entered the market creating ANCEL, leading to a significant decline 
in prices and increasing the number of consumers. The mobile telephony market remained a 
duopoly until the end of 2001, and there was no real competition between both firms: the 
technological decisions were determined to a greater extent by ANTEL, with MOVICOM 
following suit. This situation changed in the last couple of years as a result of two auctions of 
mobile phone frequencies, with MOVICOM - BELLSOUTH and CTI Móvil entering into the 
market as competitors.  
 
II. 6  Water and sewerage sector 
 
Law N° 11.902, dated December 19
th 1952, created the Administration of Sewerage Works of 
the State (OSE), with the responsibility of providing potable water and sewer services in 
Uruguay. However, the Local Government of Montevideo remained in charge of the provision 
of sewer services in the capital city. In 1993 and 1996, OSE signed concession agreements 
with to private firms, URAGUA and Aguas de la Costa, for the provision of potable water and 
sewerage in some areas in the countryside.  
 
OSE’s supply of water and sewerage has grown strongly in the last decade. Water services 
coverage reaches 96% in the country, while sewerage coverage reaches only 25%. New 
connections have determined an expansion of services for costumers with the lowest 
consumption rates and water production has been growing at a faster pace than revenue, thus 
leading to increasing losses. OSE’s tariff structure has not been adapted to meet the 
enterprise’s costs and exhibits several problems such as unjustifiable differences between 
residential and commercial tariffs, different costs but equal tariffs in Montevideo and the 
countryside and highly concentrated delays in payments.   
 
As regards the sewerage services provided by the Local Government of Montevideo, the 
coverage reaches 72% of the 433 thousand households in the capital city. Until 2001, 
sewerage services were financed by three taxes whereby the Local Government received 
approximately US$ 18 millions/year, while the costs (including investments) amounted to US$ 
40 millions; deficits were covered by the municipal government. In 2001, a new tariff with 
fixed and variable annuities substituted those taxes. It is assumed that this new system will 
substantially increase the Local Government’s revenues and reduce the financial deficits. 
However, delays in payments have risen from 18% to 30% in the last couple of years. 
   9
With reference to the concessionaires, URAGUA serves almost 50 thousand water 
connections. Coverage for sewerage services is rather low in the geographical area 
encompassed by the firm. On the other hand, Aguas de la Costa has experienced an important 
growth in the number of connections and services despite its small size.  
 
In 2004, the Constitution of the Republic was reformed by a plebiscite to forbid private 
provision of water and sewage. As a result, URAGUA left the country. There is still some 
legal controversy about the scope of the reform, so some private suppliers might remain.  
 
 
III.  THEORETICAL MODEL  
 
The general equilibrium model implemented in this work is based on Löfgren, Lee Harris and 
Robinson (2001), who follow the tradition set by Dervis, De Melo and Robinson (1982). The 
model comprises a series of simultaneous equations, many of which are non – linear, which 
define the behavior of the different agents. In some cases, equations reflect simple behavior 
rules captured by fixed coefficients, as is the case of ad valorem taxes. For production and 
consumption decisions, agents’ maximizing behavior is captured by non – linear, first – order 
optimality conditions. The model also includes a series of constraints that must be satisfied by 
the system as a whole or by each particular agent; these constraints cover macroeconomic 
aggregates and commodities and factor markets, ensuring the corresponding equilibrium.  
 
This section gives a brief overview of the main characteristics of the model, avoiding any 
mathematical notation. A more detailed presentation of the model can be found in Löfgren, 
Harris and Robinson (2001). 
 
III.1  Activities, production and factor markets  
 
Each producer (represented by an activity) is assumed to maximize profits, defined as the 
difference between revenue earned and the cost of factors and intermediate outputs. Profits are 
maximized subject to a technological restriction, taken as given the prices of production 
factors. The technological restriction is represented by a nested production function: at the top 
level, the technology is specified as a CES production function combining quantities of 
aggregate intermediate input and value - added. At the second level, aggregate intermediate 
input is a Leontief function of disaggregated intermediate inputs, whereas value – added is 
itself a CES function combining capital and labor. Intermediate inputs are composite 
commodities comprising domestic and imported commodities; an Armington function reflects 
the assumption that commodities produced in different regions are different from each other in 
quality.   10
 



























Source: Adapted from Löfgren, Lee Harris and Robinson (2001). 
 
Each activity produces one or more goods, but each good is produced by only one activity. 
The revenue of each activity is defined as the product of the level of the activity and the 
commodity prices at the producer level. In factor markets it is assumed that the quantity 
supplied of each factor is fixed at the observed level and each activity uses a set of factors up 
to the point where the marginal revenue product of each factor is equal to its wage (also called 
factor price or rent). Factor demand is a decreasing function of factor price.  
 
Although this is a static model, short - and long – term effects can be taken into account by 
adopting different assumptions regarding adjustments in the factors markets. Long – term 
equilibrium implies perfect sectorial factor mobility and flexible wages, thus leading to full 
employment. Factor wage is set at the price that equals factor supply and demand, and is the 
same for the whole economy. Alternatively, it is possible to explore unemployment levels that 
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III.2 Institutions   
 
Institutions are represented by households, enterprises, the government and the rest of the 
world.   
 
Households receive incomes from the factors of production and transfers from enterprises and 
from the government; they use their income to make transfers to other institutions, pay taxes, 
consume goods and save. Transfers and direct taxes are defined as fixed shares of household 
income. Household savings depend on the macroeconomic closure rule chosen: either a fixed 
savings rate can be assumed, or it can depend on investment levels. Consumption expenditure 
is determined as a residual, and is allocated across different commodities according to a utility 
function from which lineal demand functions can be derived. Consumption is obtained as the 
product of the consumed quantities and the market prices of the consumed commodities.  
 
Enterprises are assumed to retain capital incomes and receive transfers from other institutions. 
Enterprise incomes are allocated to direct taxes and savings. Finally, their savings are 
transferred to the households. 
 
The government collects ad valorem taxes and uses its income to purchase commodities for its 
consumption and to make transfers to other institutions. It is assumed that government 
consumption is fixed in real (quantity) terms and transfers are indexed according to a 
consumer price index. Government savings can be treated either as an endogenous or an 
exogenous variable.  
 
III.3 Commodity  markets   
 
Aggregated domestic output is allocated between exports and domestic sales on the 
assumption that suppliers maximize sales revenue for any given aggregate output level, 
subject to imperfect substitutability between exports and domestic sales, expressed by a CET 
function. In the international market, export demands are infinitely elastic at given world 
prices. The price received by domestic suppliers for exports is expressed in domestic currency 
and is obtained by multiplying the international price by the exchange rate and then deducting 
transaction costs of domestic marketing and export taxes.  
Domestic demand is equal to the sum of intermediate demand, government consumption, 
household consumption, investment and stock variation. All domestic market demands are for 
a composite commodity made up of imports and domestic output, the demands for which are 
derived on the assumption that domestic demanders minimize costs subject to imperfect 
substitutability. This is captured by an Armington function. Commodities are valued at market 
prices. In the case of imported commodities, import prices paid by domestic demanders are 
obtained by multiplying the international price by the exchange rate and including import 
tariffs and transaction costs.  
 
III.4  Macroeconomic balances  
 
The model includes three macroeconomic balances: the government balance, the external 
balance (the current account of the balance of payments) and the savings – investment balance. 
Table 3 displays several alternative closure rules for these balances.   12
 
Table 3 – Alternative closure rules for macroeconomic balances 
Constraint 
Government External  balance  Savings  -  Investment 
1 – Flexible government savings; 
fixed tax rates, transfers and 
government expenditures. 
1 – Fixed trade balance and 
foreign savings; flexible real 
exchange rate.  
1 – Fixed capital formation; 
uniform savings rates point 
change for selected institutions. 
2 – Fixed government savings; 
uniform tax rate point change for 
selected institutions. 
2 – Flexible foreign savings; 
fixed real exchange rate. 
2 – Fixed capital formation: 
scaled savings rates for selected 
institutions. 
    3 – Flexible capital formation; 
fixed savings rates for all non – 
government institutions.  
    4 – Fixed investment and 
government consumption 
absorption shares; uniform 
savings rate point change for 
selected institutions.  
    5 – Fixed investment and 
government consumption 
absorption shares; scaled savings 
rates for selected institutions.  
Source: Adapted from Löfgren, Lee Harris and Robinson (2001). 
 
 
For the government balance, tax rates, transfers and government expenditures are considered 
fixed by default, whereas government savings is a flexible residual. Alternatively, it can be 
assumed that government savings is fixed and some tax rates of selected domestic institutions 
(households and enterprises) are adjusted endogenously to generate a fixed level of 
government savings. There are also other closure rules options that were not considered in this 
work. 
 
For the external balance (which is expressed in foreign currency), the default closure is that 
the trade balance is fixed, whereas the exchange rate is variable. Given that all other items in 
the external balance are fixed, foreign savings is also fixed. If, ceteris paribus, foreign savings 
are below the exogenous level, a depreciation of the real exchange rate would correct this 
situation by simultaneously reducing spending on imports and increasing earning from 
exports, thus leading to the exogenous level of foreign savings. Under an alternative closure, 
the real exchange rate is fixed while foreign savings (and the trade balance) is flexible. 
However, this option was not taken into account in this work.  
 
For the savings – investment balance there are 5 possible closure rules. It can be assumed that 
closures are either investment – driven (the value of savings adjust) or savings – driven (the 
value of investment adjusts). The default closure is investment – driven: real investment 
quantities are fixed and the value of savings adjusts to that level. In order to generate savings 
that equal the cost of the investment bundle, the base – year savings rates of selected non - 
government institutions (typically households) can be allowed to vary or, alternatively, can be 
multiplied by a certain endogenous scalar. A third option is savings – driven: all non –  13
government savings rates are fixed and the quantity of each commodity in the investment 
bundle is multiplied by an endogenous scalar so as to assure that the investment cost will be 
equal to the savings value. Fourth, investment and government expenditure can be considered 
fixed shares of nominal absorption, so the residual share for household is also fixed. The 
savings rates of selected non - government institutions are adjusted in the same proportion. 
Finally, a variation of the last closure rule is to scale the savings rates of selected institutions 
so as to generate enough savings to finance investment.  
 
IV.  MODEL CALIBRATION  
 
We calibrated the model on the data of the year 2000, which is the most recent year for which 
detailed information on the Uruguayan economy from various relevant sources is available. 
We built a social accounting matrix (SAM) for Uruguay using National Accounts, input – 
output tables, trade data, information on household income and expenditure, on government’s 
financial operations and on the balance of payments. Due to the particular goals of this study, 




Following Reinert and Roland – Holst (1992), the Social Accounting Matrix was constructed 
in two stages, using a “top – down” approach.
4 The first step was to create a National 
Accounting Matrix by representing the Uruguayan National Accounts in matrix form. Besides 
National Accounts, several information sources were used so as to build this aggregated 
matrix: data on government income and expenditure were obtained from the Social Security 
Administration (BPS), from the Budget and Planning Office (OPP), the Municipal 
Government of Montevideo and the National Customs Authority.  Information regarding 
household and enterprise incomes, expenditures and savings was taken from the 1994 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey and the Continuous Household Survey for the 
year 2000, whereas data regarding transactions with the rest of the world were provided by the 
Central Bank of Uruguay and the Balance of Payments.   
 
The second stage was to disaggregate certain cells of the matrix using additional information, 
expanding the National Accounting Matrix into a full SAM. The disaggregated SAM includes 
30 economic activities, 36 commodities, 2 production factors (labor and capital), 3 institutions 
(household, enterprises and government), 6 tax accounts, a savings – investment account and 
an account for the rest of the world. Households are disaggregated by income decile groups 
and the foreign sector is not differentiated by origin. The resulting matrix comprises 92 files 
and rows, and is measured in millions of 2000 dollars, although units of measure and amounts 
are less relevant in this type of exercise than the variables’ ratio accuracy (relative weight). 
5  
 
Taking this information as a benchmark and using behavior parameters such as factor 
substitution elasticities and elasticities of substitution between domestic and imported 
                                                 
3 For a discussion of SAMs and their use in economy – wide policy analysis see Dervis, de Melo and Robinson 
(1982), Pyatt and Round (1985) and Reinert and Roland – Holst (1997). 
4 A more detailed account of the construction of the SAM can be found in Katz et al. (2004). 
5 See Katz et al. (2004) for an accurate definition of the different accounts, their values and their information 
requirements.   14
commodities found in the literature, we calibrated all other parameters in order to replicate the 
base data. The calibration process and the numerical resolution of the model follow classic 
procedures used in most static CGE models. The model was numerically solved with the 
software GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling Systems).  
 
V. SIMULATIONS   
 
We assessed the macroeconomic impacts of reforms of the regulatory framework of public 
services, changes in their investment policies, modifications in the competitive environment 
and reforms in their tax structure. These reforms can be simulated through changes in three 
groups of parameters: technical coefficients, sectoral capital stocks and tax rates. 
Improvements in technical efficiency are captured by changes in the technical coefficients of 
the model. Investment policies in public enterprises can be captured by changes in the capital 
stock of the activities. Finally, changes in the tax structure and in the prices of public services 
induced by new regulatory and competition policies are captured by changes in the activities’ 
tax rates. In order to capture the price effect of changes in the regulatory or competitive 
environment, implicit tax rates for public services were defined. An expected decline in the 
price of a public service due to the introduction of competition was then simulated as a 
reduction in the activity’s implicit tax rate; should competition be represented by foreign 
firms, a reduction in the equivalent import tariff on the activity’s imports was simulated.  
 
Table 5 shows the different types of simulations performed for each of the public sectors 
considered. 
 
Table 5 – Simulations performed 
 
Public service  Efficiency  Capital stock  Specific tax  
Railroad transportation  X     
Electric energy (generation)  X  X   
Fuel X    X 
Gas X     
Telecommunications     X 
Water and sewerage  X  X   
 
 
Each scenario is defined by a particular combination of efficiency – capital stock – specific tax 
for each and every public service considered. In turn, each particular combination is coupled 
with different closure rules for the government and the factor markets. We specified two 
closure rules for the government and two for the factor markets. Therefore, there are 4 
possible scenarios for each efficiency – capital stock – specific tax combination, leading to 44 
simulations:  
  15
Table 6 – Scenarios for the simulations 
 
Scenario  Factor markets closure  Government closure 




(exogenous tax rates) 
B  Short – term (unemployment)
Endogenous government 
savings 
 (exogenous tax rates) 
C  Long – term  
(full employment) 
Exogenous government 
savings, endogenous value 
added tax 
D  Short – term (unemployment)
Exogenous government 




As already mentioned, the standard model of Löfgren, Lee Harris and Robinson (2001) allows 
to simulate two closure rules for the external account (Rest of the World) and five for the 
savings – investment account. Since the number of possible scenarios then becomes too big, 
and since the main goal of this study is to assess the welfare effects of the reforms, attention 
was focused on scenarios with exogenous foreign savings, flexible real exchange rate and 
fixed investment and government expenditure. As mentioned by Löfgren, Lee Harris and 
Robinson (2001), scenarios where foreign savings, investment or government expenditure are 
assumed endogenous might lead to erroneous evaluation of the welfare effects in the present 
model.  
 
VI.  SIMULATION RESULTS   
 
This section reviews the main results of the 44 simulations performed. These are comparative 
static exercises, and the results are presented as percent variations from the initial equilibrium 
(the benchmark). For each simulation, the results for the scenario with long – term (full 
employment) and fixed tax rates (endogenous government savings) closures are initially 
analyzed. Then, the main changes stemming from considering short – term (unemployment 
derived from fixed wages) and exogenous government savings closures are commented.  
 
The rationale for each of the simulations is explained below. An Annex to this paper displays 
tables showing the simulation results for the long-term (full employment) and fixed tax rates 
(endogenous government savings) closure. Quantitative results for other model closures are 
available upon request from the authors.  
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VI.1  RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION SECTOR  
 
Privatization of two railroad lines is assumed, and an increase in railroad activity occurs. 
Privatization determines an increase in productivity leading to heightened factor use and 
service supply.  
 
This simulation allows an evaluation of the effects of an increase in the productivity of the 
railroad transportation sector, given the productive structure prevailing in Uruguay. It could be 
argued that this policy change might be accompanied by an increased demand from some 
railroad services consumers, such as the forestry sector. Precisely, the reform in the railroad 
sector policy might intend to meet this increased demand. Assuming no increase in the 
demand for railroad transportation services, the resulting supply increase could only be 
absorbed by substituting other services as a result of lowered prices.  
 
VI.1.1 Simulation parameters   
 
The productivity coefficient is increased by 20%. 
 
VI.1.2 Results with full employment (long – term) and fixed tax rates 
 
A 33% increase in the use of labor and capital is achieved (Table A3), with a 60% increase in 
the sectoral GDP (Table A2).  On the other hand, factor use in the other sectors declines. 
However, such reduction in factor use is rather unimportant, given the small relative size of 
the railroad transportation sector in the economy.  
 
The price of railroad services was endogenously lowered by almost 14% (Tables A8 and A9). 
No variation in the real exchange rate is observed, while factor wages exhibit a small 
reduction. 
 
Since railroad transportation services are non – tradable, there are no direct effects of the 
increase in railroad productivity on foreign trade (Tables A5 and A6). Indirect effects taking 
place via other activities are rather unimportant.  
 
Government finances experience no significant changes (Table A11).  
 
Households experience mild welfare gains, evenly distributed among income deciles (Table 
A12). 
 
No significant changes occur in this scenario at the aggregate level (Table A1). There are no 
major changes in aggregate demand and supply.  
 
Within this simulation, investment in the railroad sector would reach approximately US$ 30 
million, much lower than the US$ 60 million suggested by existing estimates of possible  17
investment projects.
6 Sensitivity analyses were performed, varying the expected productivity 
increase and demand elasticities for railroad services, but it was not possible to achieve a US$ 
60 million investment in this scenario. This may suggest that the projected investments could 
only take place under a different scenario, assuming a considerable increase in the demand for 
railroad transportation services.  
 
VI.1.3 Alternative closure rules: short – term scenario and endogenous tax rates  
 
In the short-term scenario, similar increases in factor use and sectoral GDP were obtained. As 
in the long – term scenario, changes in factor use and the sectoral GDP of the other sectors 
were relatively small. No significant effects on exports, imports and prices were observed 
either.  
 
In scenarios with endogenous value added tax rates, small increases in tax revenues were 
achieved, whereas in scenarios with exogenous tax rates minimal increases (0.0007 percentage 
points of GDP) in government deficits took place. Also, slightly lower household welfare 
gains were achieved, which indicates that estimates based on endogenous tax rates over – 
estimate them. However, differences were again minimal, indicating that errors in assessing 
welfare gains when allowing government savings to vary endogenously are qualitatively 
negligible.  
 
VI.2  ELECTRIC ENERGY SECTOR  
 
As already mentioned, the prevailing regulatory framework authorizes private generation of 
electricity. This would allow the entry of firms that could take advantage of economies 
associated with the use of disposable products as fuel for generating electricity or that might 
use heat released during the generation process for industrial purposes. On the other hand, the 
integration with Argentina might increase the energetic risk faced by Uruguay. Therefore, the 
government is considering a project to establish a big generating plant built by UTE or by 
concessionaires. However, the construction of such a plant would render smaller plants 
(associated with large consumers) economically unappealing. Therefore, there is a trade – off 
between safety and cost. In view of this situation, two scenarios were simulated: in the first 
one, it is assumed that no bigger plant is built, but investments in smaller, more productive 
generators take place; in the second scenario, it is assumed that the government opts to build 
the new generating plant.  
 
VI.2.1  Scenario 1  
 
Private generation of electric energy leads to an increase in productivity. A group of large 
consumers invests in electric energy generation in order to take advantage of energy contained 
in some disposable products such as rice husk. There is also productivity gains associated with 
the use of heat released in the generation process for industrial purposes. This could lead to 
investments in private electric energy generation for an estimated value of US$ 150 million.  
                                                 
6 Approximately 33% of the US$ 80 million of initial capital stock in the railroad sector. This estimation should 
be taken carefully in view of the difficulties faced to assess the initial capital stock. Therefore, results should be 
considered only in qualitative terms.   18
 
This simulation aims to assess the possible impacts of an increase in sectoral productivity, 
given the productive structure of the economy. Other exogenous shocks that might 
simultaneously affect the electric sector are not taken into account; in particular, the joint 
effect of a productivity increase and of heightened demand for electricity is not considered. 
Therefore, this simulation should not be interpreted as a projection, but as a comparative static 
exercise. 
 
VI.2.1.1 Simulation parameters   
 
The productivity coefficient is increased by 8%. It must be taken into account that, in order to 
attain an 8% average growth in productivity in the electricity sector, the new generators should 
experience a substantially higher increase. 
 
VI.2.1.2 Results with full employment (long – term) and fixed tax rates 
 
A 9% increase in the use of labor and capital in the electric sector is achieved (Table A3). 
Electric supply increases by more than 18% (table A2) as a result of the combination of the 
productivity increase and the enhanced use of factors. Some of the other sectors exhibit 
increases (the largest taking place in leather industries, with more than 3%), while some 
experience reductions (export industries, wood and paper and chemical industries, water and 
sewerage services). In the context of this model, growth in expanding sectors responds to a 
greater availability of electric energy combined with its lower price, whereas decline in the 
activity of contracting sectors responds to the reallocation of resources towards electric energy 
generation and expanding sectors. The model assumes that the total factor endowment in the 
economy is fixed, so a sectoral reallocation of resources takes place as a result of the technical 
change in electric generation. Should total factor availability increase as a result of population 
growth and capital accumulation, sectors that contracted in the simulation might eventually 
grow. Therefore, the analyzed technological change in the electricity generation sector might 
not necessarily lead to a decline in the activity of some sectors, but to lower growth.  
 
Augmented generation of electric energy would result in a substantial increase in exports 
(23%) and in electric energy (14%) and fuel oil (14%) imports (Tables A5 y A6). The increase 
in exports and imports should be interpreted with caution, because the model assumes a rigid 
technology and does not allow to accurately represent import substitution that would be 
associated with enhanced domestic generation of electric energy.  The same can be said about 
the estimated increase in imports of fuel oil. The price of electricity in the domestic market 
falls by approximately 4% (Table A8). This decrease originates in the augmented supply 
caused by the productivity increase that can only be absorbed by demand through a price 
reduction. 
 
Household welfare increases slightly, particularly for middle and upper class households 
(Table A12). 
 
No significant variations in macroeconomic aggregates are observed (Table A1). 
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VI.2.1.3 Alternative closure rules: short – term scenario and endogenous tax rates  
 
Increase in factor use in the short – term is similar to the one achieved in the long – term, 
though the rise in labor use is slightly inferior and in capital use is marginally larger. Increase 
in sectoral GDP is almost the same, while growth in leather industries and decline in export 
industries, wood and paper and chemical industries is higher in the short run. According to 
these results, fixed wages might cause bigger quantity – adjustments and smaller price – 
adjustments in the short – term. Effects on exports, imports and prices are very similar in the 
short and the long run.  
 
The modification of the government closure rules had small effects on results. Slight increases 
in value added tax revenues were achieved, though smaller in the endogenous value added tax 
rates scenario.  Impacts on sectoral factor use, production, foreign trade and prices remained 
quite similar. In theory, the assumption of exogenous government savings is more appropriate 
than the scenario with endogenous government savings for assessing household welfare 
effects. Nevertheless, equivalent variations are very similar in both scenarios.  
 
VI.2.2  Scenario 2  
 
A central energy generating plant is built, while productivity remains unchanged. The rise in 
capital stock results from a political decision, not being caused by productivity increases, 
lower taxes or higher prices. The political decision is simulated by depicting electric energy 
generation as an activity not driven by private profit seeking; there is no profit maximization 
in the activity, and factor use is exogenously fixed. Capital supply for the rest of the economy 
is the difference between total capital supply minus fixed capital in the electrical sector. 
Therefore, this scenario implies a reallocation of capital from competitive sectors to electricity 
sector. Resulting profits or losses are directly transferred to the government in the form of 
taxes or subsidies.  
 
VI.2.2.1 Simulation parameters   
 
An exogenous US$ 150 million increase in the capital stock in the electricity sector is assumed 
as a result of the construction of the generating plant.  
 
 
VI.2.2.2 Results with full employment (long – term) and fixed tax rates 
 
Factor use increases 8%, reflecting the political decision of investing in the sector (Table A3). 
Investment amounts to approximately US$ 145 million. Private investment in smaller but 
more efficient generators is crowded out by public investment in the new plant. Factor use in a 
larger - than - economically - efficient scale causes losses that result in a bigger government 
deficit; the investment is justified on strategic, not efficiency, grounds. The activity’s output 
also goes up by 8% as a direct result of the rise of resources allocated in the sector without 
changes in productivity (Table A2). Slight increases arise in other activities’ sectoral GDP, the 
greatest taking place in the leather industries (1.28 %). Other sectors contract as a result of 
reallocation of resources towards electric energy generation, the greatest decline occurring in 
export industries (1.41 %).   20
 
A 10% increase in electricity exports (Table A5) is achieved, while electricity and fuel oil 
imports grow slightly over 6%. Domestic price of electricity falls 2% (Table A9). As in the 
first scenario, changes in exports and imports should be interpreted with caution: the 
construction of the new plant might lead to import substitution, not captured by the model.  
 
A modest increase of household welfare is observed for all income deciles (Table A12). 
However, this increase results from the bigger government deficit and from the fact that the 
model does not incorporate the future costs of a higher debt. On the other hand, the 
construction of the generating plant should lead to enhanced energy security, reducing the risk 
of facing a shortage of electric supply. The model cannot capture the resulting welfare gains. 
 
No significant changes in macroeconomic aggregates are observed (Table A1).  
 
VI.2.2.3 Alternative closure rules: short – term scenario and endogenous tax rates  
 
Factor use and sectoral GDP increase is the same in the short and the long term. Leather 
industries’ growth rate and the decline in exporting industries, wood and paper and chemical 
industries are slightly larger in the sort run. Quantity – adjustments are also bigger and price – 
adjustments are lower in the short term, though differences are not significant. Impacts on 
exports, imports and prices are very similar in the short and the long run.  
 
In the scenarios with endogenous value added tax rates an increase in value added tax 
revenues is achieved, thus enabling the government to balance its budget. The necessary 
increase in value added tax revenues is higher in the short term than in the long term. In the 
short term, a minor reduction in employment arises; this causes a reduction in government 
revenues and requires a bigger adjustment. No important differences in equivalent variations 
were achieved in relation to the government closure rule. Alternatively assuming that the 
government adjustment takes place either through higher indebtedness or through an 
endogenous variation in value added tax rates does not result in significant changes in the 
equivalent variation associated with the investment.  
 
VI.3 FUEL  SECTOR   
 
The elimination of ANCAP’s monopoly on fuel production and imports of oil was expected to 
lead to tougher competition in the domestic market, therefore causing an improvement in the 
enterprise’s technical efficiency and driving it to seek foreign markets. Four different 
simulations were performed in order to assess the possible effects of these reforms: in the first 
scenario, the elimination of ANCAP’s monopoly rights is simulated. In the second and third 
scenarios, the variation in factor productivity needed to preserve the refinery’s output level 
following the demonopolization is estimated; the third experiment differs from the second one 
in that it is assumed that ANCAP associates with foreign firms to export fuel. Finally, the 
fourth scenario analyses the effect of a change in tax policy. 
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VI.3.1 Scenario 1  
 
ANCAP’s monopolistic control of fuel production and distribution is eliminated. Given the 
small size of the domestic market and the existence of scale – economies, it is unlikely that a 
new refinery will be built, so ANCAP’s refinery should not face competition from other plants 
in the domestic market. However, it will face competition from imported fuel. This constraint 
can be modeled as a quantitative restriction on imports of oil derivatives that prevents imports. 
This can be modeled by introducing an import tariff equivalent to the quantitative restriction. 
The demonopolization would motivate the entry of imported fuel that would compete with 
domestic production, and would be the same as removing the quantitative restriction and 
opening the domestic market to foreign competition. This would cause a decrease in domestic 
prices of oil derivatives whose magnitude depends on the effectiveness of competition policies 
implemented.  
 
The impact of a change in the degree of competition is analyzed through a simulated change in 
the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported fuel. It can be assumed that if the 
fuel market becomes very competitive following the reform, the elasticity of substitution 
between domestic and imported fuel would tend to infinity, domestic and international prices 
would converge, and significant changes in the quantities of domestic and imported fuel would 
take place. On the other hand, in a less competitive environment, importers would extract rents 
derived from the difference between import and domestic prices, and variations in the 
quantities of domestic and imported fuel would be much smaller. In order to perform these 
experiments, different substitution elasticities in the Armington function were simulated.  
 
VI.3.1.1 Simulation parameters   
 
The tariff equivalent of a quantitative restriction on imports can be computed as:   
 
Domestic Price




The estimated import tariffs for gasoline and gas oil were 24% and 14%, respectively. The 
elimination of ANCAP’s monopoly rights was simulated by lowering those import tariffs to 
zero. The experiment was repeated for each of the four macroeconomic closure rules 
considered, and a sensitivity analysis considering different substitution elasticities in the 
Armington function was also performed.  
 
VI.3.1.2 Results with full employment (long – term) and fixed tax rates 
 
The effects of demonopolization in the fuel market are virtually insignificant at the aggregate 
level (Table A1). There are no relevant effects on production, consumption, tax revenues or 
government expenditure. The most important effects are those related to foreign trade: both 
imports and exports rise by 0.6%. Government deficit increases by a mere 0.01% of GDP, 
mainly due to the decline of monopolistic rents (considered as equivalent import tariffs) 
transferred by ANCAP to the central government.  
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However, the sectoral effects of the reform are quite important, particularly with regard to the 
refinery. Following the opening of the domestic market to imported fuel, the prices of 
imported gasoline and gas oil fall by 15% and 11% respectively, while imports rise (Tables A6 
and A10). Refinery output decreases 4.3%, affecting all types of oil derivatives. The price of 
gas oil declines by 7%, while the price of gasoline and other derivatives increase (Table A9) 
as a result of an excess demand resulting from the decrease in the refinery output. Refinery’s 
labor and capital demand fall by 4.5% and 4.3% respectively, while labor use of several export 
industries rises. There is a reallocation of resources from the refinery towards agriculture, rice 
and barley, meat, rice, leather industries and other export industries, and towards the 
transportation sector.  
 
The effects on income distribution are rather small: the poorest households (those belonging to 
the first five income deciles) benefit from the reform, while higher income households 
experiment welfare losses (Table A12).  
 
It is worth noting that these results were achieved under the assumption that domestic and 
imported commodities are no close substitutes (the Armington elasticity of substitution was 
assumed to be 10). The results are in fact very sensitive to this assumption. When low 
substitution elasticity values are used, the price effect is important while the quantity effect is 
small, implying that the economic feasibility of the refinery would not be affected. On the 
other hand, if trade liberalization and competition policies are simultaneously implemented, 
leading to perfect substitution between domestic and imported commodities, results change 
drastically. As an example, if an Armington substitution of 2 is used, the output of the refinery 
decreases 1.2%, whereas if a value of 30 is assumed, the output of the refinery would drop by 
39%, making it difficult for the refinery to remain operative.  
 
Nevertheless, in any scenario the most relevant results are related to foreign trade and resource 
allocation between the refinery and export industries; the effects on other variables are 
minimal. Therefore, a representative agent of the economy would hardly be affected by a 
reform in the fuel market, whereas specific groups of agents linked to export industries and to 
the transportation sector would clearly benefit from it. The refinery workers and the State 
could be negatively affected unless measures aiming at productive restructuring are adopted.  
 
Finally, two further remarks should be made. The relatively small effects of the reform may be 
related to the type of general equilibrium model used in this exercise. The literature suggests 
that the effects are significantly larger in the presence of economies of scale and non – 
competitive markets. Besides, the magnitude of the effects is also related to the estimated 
equivalent import tariffs. These estimates are clearly imperfect because import prices vary 
greatly within a year, frequently as a result of political decisions.  
 
VI.3.1.3 Alternative closure rules: short – term scenario and endogenous tax rates  
 
Similar results are achieved when assuming different labor market closure rules or endogenous 
tax rates. Decline in factor use and in output is slightly higher, while export industries’ growth 
rate is lower. Other effects are very similar in the short and the long term.  
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As regards government closure rules, assuming endogenous value added tax rates leads to 
small increases in value added tax revenues that were fixed in the other scenarios. Effects on 
foreign trade, production, sectoral factor use and prices remain the same. In theory, assuming 
exogenous instead of endogenous government savings is more appropriate for assessing 
household welfare effects. Equivalent variations are nonetheless very similar in both 
scenarios.   
 
VI.3.2 Scenario 2 
 
In this scenario, demonopolization of the fuel market is combined with a productivity increase 
that reduces ANCAP’s production costs and enables it to compete with imported fuel and to 
export. We intended to estimate the magnitude of the productivity increase needed to avoid a 
decline in refinery output.  
 
VI.3.2.1 Simulation parameters   
 
A technical change affecting factor productivity was simulated. This technical change affects 
administrative, distributive functions and the like, but does not change input - output 
coefficients of the fuel production function; thus, the quantity of intermediate inputs per unit 
of output remains unchanged, affecting only factor requirements per unit of output. This 
implies a variation in total factor productivity in the value added CES function. The 
experiment is the same as the one conducted in Scenario 1: equivalent import tariffs on 
gasoline and gas oil were reduced to zero. Several simulations were performed until a value of 
the productivity parameter that left the refinery output unchanged was found.  
 
VI.3.2.2 Results with full employment (long – term) and fixed tax rates 
 
With a productivity increase of 18%, refinery output remains constant when demonopolization 
of the fuel market takes place. Macroeconomic results are slightly higher than in the previous 
scenario: private consumption rises by 0.5%, while GDP grows by 0.4%. On the other hand, 
sectoral and foreign trade effects are lower; there is a minor reallocation of resources towards 
export sectors and services (Table A2). A decline in factor use in the refinery is observed as a 
result of increased productivity (Table A3). Gasoline and gas oil imports increase, but less 
than in Scenario 1 (Table A6). Domestic prices of gasoline and gas oil decline by 1.4% and 
9.2% respectively, but this does not lead to an increase in consumption because of the low 
demand elasticity assumed (see Table A9). Productivity increase causes a 1% rise in labor 
wages, while capital rent increases by 0.1%. All households obtain welfare gains, the larger 
being for high - income deciles (Table A12).  
 
The simulation shows that a significant productivity increase is required to maintain the 
refinery output level when demonopolization takes place. The question remains whether it is 
possible to reach such productivity increase. The rise in productivity affects the production 
function, thus influencing both exports and domestic market sales. Nevertheless, as export 
prices are fixed, this productivity increase determines a decline in domestic prices in order to 
face competition of imported commodities. Other possibility, not explored in this experiment, 
is that part of the productivity increase may be related to a decline in transport costs and 
export commercialization costs. On the other hand, remarks previously made about the value  24
of substitution elasticities and the estimation of equivalent import tariffs are also valid in this 
scenario: a 9% rise in productivity is required so as to maintain the refinery output when an 
Armington elasticity of 2 is assumed, whereas a 30% increase is needed when a value of 30 is 
assumed. Finally, the small reaction of household consumption following price changes must 
be interpreted with caution: it is likely that if other functional forms had been used, price 
effects would have been lower, and the growth of household consumption would have been 
higher.  
 
VI.3.2.3 Alternative closure rules: short – term scenario and endogenous tax rates  
 
Imposing nominal wage rigidities in the short run would cause a rise in employment: although 
the refinery still “expels” workers, employment rises in other sectors, thus motivating a 1.3% 
increase in total employment. In this scenario, we assumed unemployment and fixed wages. 
Thus the rise in labor demand fostered by productivity gains raises employment. Capital is 
reallocated from the refinery to export sectors, as with the previous closure rules. The 
productivity increase needed to keep the refinery output constant is somewhat lower: in fact, 
with an 18% increase, the refinery output would rise. GDP, private consumption, exports and 
imports increase by 1.2% in this simulation, while fiscal deficit declines. Also, welfare gains 
are larger in the short run: equivalent variations rise by 1.5% on average, with a larger increase 
for high - income households. 
 
Simulations with endogenous value - added tax rate lead to a small rise in value added tax 
revenues that were fixed in other scenarios. Effects on foreign trade, output, sectoral factor use 
and prices remained very similar.   
 
VI.3.3 Scenario 3 
 
In this scenario, demonopolization of ANCAP’s monopoly rights to fuel production and 
distribution, a technical change that originates a rise in factor productivity and the introduction 
of policy measures aiming to promote fuel exports were simulated. The latter intends to 
answer the following question: how do previous conclusions change if ANCAP manages to 
associate with private partners in order to secure access to foreign markets? 
 
In previous scenarios, demonopolization causes the entry of imported fuel that competes with 
domestic output. The resulting effect depends on the regulatory framework and the degree of 
competition prevailing when demonopolization takes place. When a high value for substitution 
elasticity between domestic and imported commodities is assumed, this could lead to an 
important decline in the refinery output. In Scenario 2 it was concluded that this decline could 
be avoided by implementing a technical change leading to an 18% rise in factor productivity. 
Scenario 3 aims to estimate the magnitude of the productivity increase required to keep the 
refinery output constant if, at the same time, the elasticity of substitution between domestic 
and exportable commodities rises. The impact of an association between ANCAP and a 
foreign investor was analyzed changing this elasticity of substitution. If this investor has fluent 
access to foreign markets, the elasticity of substitution between domestic and exportable 
commodities may rise, and sales in foreign markets might compensate losses in the domestic 
market.  
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VI.3.3.1 Simulation parameters   
 
In order to simulate the demonopolization of the domestic fuel market, equivalent import 
tariffs were reduced to zero, as in Scenarios 1 and 2, while an increase from 0.8 to 10 in the 
elasticity of transformation (CET) function was assumed so as to simulate the effects of 
gaining access to foreign markets. Besides, as in Scenario 2, several changes in factor 
productivity were simulated using the CET function scale parameter. Finally, a sensitivity 
analysis was performed using different Armington elasticities.  
 
VI.3.3.2 Results with full employment (long – term) and fixed tax rates 
 
The joint implementation of these three policy measures has minor effects on the 
macroeconomic aggregates. The most important impacts are a 0.7% rise in exports and a 0.6% 
increase in imports. There are no significant effects on output, consumption, revenues and 
government expenditure. Global results are similar to the ones in previous scenarios; the 
largest differences arise in sectoral effects, particularly in the refinery.  
 
When the domestic market is opened up for unrestricted trade, imports increase and gasoline 
and gas oil import prices fall by 15% and 10%, respectively (Tables A6 and A10). Unlike in 
the other scenarios, gasoline exports rise by 16% while gas oil exports increase 189%, starting 
from very low values. In order to maintain the refinery output level, factor productivity must 
increase 16%. Prices of gas oil and gasoline decrease by 9% and 1% respectively, while prices 
of other oil derivatives remain almost constant (Table A8). Labor and capital demand in the 
refinery falls by 14% and there is a reallocation of resources towards export sectors 
(agriculture, rice and transportation). This reallocation takes place because the trade balance is 
assumed to remain constant.  
 
Effects on income distribution are minimal. Workers are the main beneficiaries, since their 
wages rise by 1%; capital rent increases by 0.1%. All household groups achieve marginal 
welfare gains, the largest increase taking place for high - income households (Table A12). 
 
This simulation shows that an increase in the elasticity of substitution between domestic and 
export sales reduces the productivity increase needed to keep the refinery operative. These 
results are highly sensitive to the elasticity of the transformation function. Also, these results 
were achieved assuming an Armington elasticity of 10, and are very sensitive to this 
assumption as well. In case demonopolization leads to a very competitive market structure, the 
productivity increase needed to keep the refinery output unchanged would be higher. If, on the 
other hand, the degree of competition were lower, the required productivity increase would 
also be lower.    
 
VI.3.3.3 Alternative closure rules: short – term scenario and endogenous tax rates  
 
As in Scenario 2, when unemployment is assumed, the rise in labor productivity leads to an 
increase in activity while wages remain constant. GDP, absorption and household 
consumption increase by more than 1%. With a 16.3% rise in productivity, refinery output 
increases while the decline in factor use is somewhat smaller than in the long run. Welfare  26
gains are much higher than in the long run: all household groups achieve welfare gains, the 
main beneficiaries being again high - income deciles. 
 
The effects on foreign trade, output, sectoral factor use and prices were similar than in the 
previous scenario when endogenous value added tax rates are assumed. Equivalent variations 
were very similar in the long run scenario with exogenous value added tax rates and in the 
long run scenario with endogenous value added tax rates.  
 
VI.3.4 Scenario 4 
 
In this scenario, sales tax (IMESI) is substituted by a homogeneous value added tax rate on 
domestic and imported fuel. There is currently very high tax discrimination between the 
different refined fuels in Uruguay (see Section II.3). This experiment intends to assess the 
effect of a tax harmonization in the fuel market.  
 
VI.3.4.1 Simulation parameters   
 
The experiment involves eliminating IMESI and setting a 23% value added tax rate on all 
refined fuels. As the value added tax on imported commodities is included in import tariffs, 
the latter rise by 23%.  
 
VI.3.4.2 Results with full employment (long – term) and fixed tax rates 
 
The effects of eliminating IMESI and raising the value added tax rate are negligible at the 
aggregate level (Table A1). However, factor wages decline and government deficit falls from 
1.26% to 0.74% of GDP as a result of heightened value added tax revenues (Table A11). 
Sectoral effects are also small: there are no significant changes in sectoral output nor in 
resource allocation (Tables A2 and A3). Import and domestic prices of all fuels decline, with 
the exception of gasoline prices (gasoline is subject to the greatest IMESI rates). Gasoline is 
mainly used for final consumption, while other fuels are mainly used for intermediate 
consumption. While production costs would rise as a result of the rise in the prices of other 
fuels, the stability of gasoline prices benefits final consumers. Tax incidence on fuels rises, 
although multiple alternatives for changing tax structure could be simulated without varying 
global tax incidence. Welfare variations are also small: this policy measure benefits 
households belonging to the first two income deciles, while negatively affecting the rest 
(Table A12). 
 
VI.3.4.3 Alternative closure rules: short – term scenario and endogenous tax rates  
 
When assuming unemployment in the short term, global results are slightly bigger. GDP falls 
0.7%, while employment declines by 1.1%. The variation of government closure rule has very 
small effects.  
 
VI.4 GAS  SECTOR   
 
The construction of a gas pipe linking Uruguay with the Argentinean network would lead to 
the substitution of gasoline by Argentinean natural gas as an input for gas production in  27
Uruguay, thereby lowering gas production costs.  In this simulation, it is assumed that gasoline 
is replaced by natural gas and that the price of Argentinean natural gas is half the price of 
gasoline. 
 
VI.4.1 Simulation parameters 
 
Gasoline needed for producing one unit of gas (ica) is replaced by the necessary amount of 
imported natural gas. It is assumed that the CIF price of imported natural gas is 48% of 
gasoline price.  
  
VI.4.2 Results with full employment (long – term) and fixed tax rates 
 
The macroeconomic impacts of this technological change are negligible, because gas use for 
industrial and residential purposes is rather limited in Uruguay. No changes in GDP, 
household consumption, foreign trade, factor wages, tax revenues or government deficit are 
observed (Tables A1, A5, A6, A7 and A11). Gas production increases as a result of the 
technical change, but no variations are observed in other sectors’ output. There is a 
reallocation of resources towards gas production, mainly from the refinery, whose output 
declines by 1% (Tables A2 and A3). A significant rise in natural gas imports takes place 
(Table A4). The domestic price of piped gas falls 24%, whereas the price of liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG) falls 32% (Table A8). Domestic prices of gasoline also fall as a result of 
excess supply. Welfare effects are positive, but limited, with an emphasis on medium and high 
- income households (Table A12).  
 
It must be taken into account that this simulation only analyses the effects of the introduction 
of Argentinean natural gas for gas production, not considering the effects on the generation of 
electricity. Besides, the experiment assumes that there are no changes in tax policies and that 
imported natural gas is subject to the same tax rates as piped gas.  
 
VI.4.3 Alternative closure rules: short – term scenario and endogenous tax rates 
 
Results in the short term are very similar to those achieved in the long term: macroeconomic 
effects are minimal. The same happens when government closure rule is changed and 
endogenous value added tax rates are imposed, assuming a constant fiscal deficit.  
 
VI.5  TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR  
 
A regulatory change is imposed in the telecommunications sector, generating increased 
competition in the mobile telephony market, demonopolizing national long distance service 
and introducing more competition in international long distance service, thereby leading to a 
decline in prices. Although some of these reforms have already been implemented in Uruguay, 
they had not been put into operation by the year 2000, the model’s base period.  
 
VI.5.1 Simulation parameters 
 
It is expected that the implementation of these reforms would lead to a 25% decrease in prices 
for telecommunication services. This decline was simulated by a reduction in activity tax  28
rates. In the case of public enterprises such as ANTEL, activity taxes are represented by the 
enterprise’s transfers to the central government. It is assumed that enhanced competition leads 
to lower monopolistic power and lower monopolistic rent extracting capacity. On the other 
hand, since telecommunication services are essentially non – tradable, Armington elasticity 
was lowered to 0.1, thus implying virtually no possibilities for substituting domestic services 
with imports.  
 
VI.5.2 Results with full employment (long – term) and fixed tax rates 
 
Effects are limited at the macroeconomic level (see Table A1). Labor and capital wages 
increase by 1.2% and 1.3%. Tax revenues fall from 28.3% to 27.5% of GDP, mainly due to 
the decline in activity tax revenues (Table A11), i.e., ANTEL’s transfers to the central 
government. Fiscal deficit rises from 1.3% to 2.1% of GDP. In view of the severe fiscal 
constraints faced by the Uruguayan government, these reforms should be accompanied by 
changes in fiscal policies compensating the loss of government revenues.  
 
Once again, more significant effects arise at the sectoral level, basically in the 
telecommunications sector (Tables A2 and A3). Prices for telecommunication services fall by 
25%, but both output and sectoral factor use increase, the latter by 7% (Tables A2 and A3). A 
reallocation of resources from tradable sectors toward telecommunications takes place. 
Household consumption of telecommunication services increases to the detriment of other 
commodities, but price effect is bigger, thus leading to a decline in expenditures for 
telecommunication services while expenditures for other commodities increase. 
 
Overall welfare gains are rather insignificant (Table A12). Changes in relative prices 
determine that the different income deciles are not equally affected: poorer households are 
negatively affected, while high – income households benefit from these policy measures.  
 
The functional form of household demand and of the production function clearly influences 
these results. Given the low price elasticity of demand, the competitive effect of the regulatory 
changes determines a significant reduction of prices without causing a substitution effect. It 
might be expected that this effect should be more important.  
 
VI.5.3 Alternative closure rules: short – term scenario and endogenous tax rates 
 
Assuming short – term unemployment leads to somewhat larger macroeconomic effects: GDP 
grows by 1%, while private consumption increases by 1.4%. Other macroeconomic results are 
very similar to those prevailing in the long – term. Telecommunications sector output rises by 
7.9% and fiscal deficit represents 3.8% of GDP. When prices for telecommunication services 
fall, the sector can absorb more workers without affecting wages. Welfare gains, as measured 
by equivalent variations, reach 1.3%. Although all household groups benefit, higher emphasis 
is placed on middle and upper classes.  
 
When government closure is modified, the results are similar to those in the long – term 
scenario with exogenous tax rates. GDP increases slightly more and telecommunications 
sector output a little less than in that scenario, while fiscal deficit does not rise because value 
added revenues increase, compensating the decrease of activity tax revenues.   29
 
VI.6  WATER AND SEWERAGE SECTOR  
 
A productivity increase in this sector is expected, leading to improved administration and 
control. More rigorous control would lead to a decline of approximately 7% in service 
consumption, whereas an increase in efficiency may take place as a result of an estimated 20% 
decline in labor costs, without affecting output level. Besides, a US$ 300 million investment in 
sewerage by OSE is projected.  
 
These modifications are simulated in two scenarios: in the first one, the possible effects of an 
efficiency increase are investigated, while in the second scenario the impacts of increasing the 
sector’s capital stock are assessed.  
 
VI.6.1 Scenario 1 
 
Efficiency increases, resulting from the combined effect of heightened revenues and lower 
labor costs, are simulated by raising the productivity parameter of the CES function combining 
capital and labor.  
 
VI.6.1.1 Simulation parameters 
 
The productivity coefficient of the water and sewerage sector is raised by 15%. 
 
VI.6.1.2   Results with full employment (long – term) and fixed tax rates 
 
Sectoral output increases by more than 22% (Table A2). Labor and capital use increase by 
more than 6% (Table A3); in fact, in this model output growth is caused by the rise in 
employment within the sector, which is highly unlikely in the Uruguayan context.  
 
Factor use in other sectors decline slightly. No important changes in foreign trade are 
observed; this is a non – tradable sector, so no direct effects on imports and exports take place. 
Indirect effects on other sectors are limited (Tables A5 and A6).  
 
Domestic price for water and sewerage services decreases by more than 9% (Table A8). This 
reduction responds to an increased supply that is not counterbalanced by greater demand; 
however, it could be assumed that there is unsatisfied demand for sanitary services in 
Uruguay, so the bigger supply could be absorbed by formerly rationed demand without 
causing price decreases.  
 
Small reductions in factor wages are observed, while the real exchange rate remains virtually 
unchanged.  
 
Household welfare effects are reduced: households belonging to the first income deciles 
experience negative variations, whereas higher – income households exhibit small gains 
(Table A12). 
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No significant changes in macroeconomic aggregates are observed (Table A1). Government 
deficit increases by 1.28%. 
 
VI.6.1.3 Alternative closure rules: short – term scenario and endogenous tax rates 
 
Increase of sectoral factor use is similar in the short and in the long – term. In the short – run, 
a slight decrease in aggregate employment is observed as a result of wage rigidities that hinder 
sectoral reallocation of workers. Indirect effects on other sectors are similar to those prevailing 
in the long – term.  
 
In the endogenous tax rates scenario, an increase in value added tax revenues enabling the 
government to balance its budget is observed. The rise in value added tax rates needed to 
balance government budget is somewhat bigger in the short run than in the long – term as a 
result of the decline in aggregate employment. As in other scenarios, changing government 
closure did not significantly affect the results regarding household welfare.  
 
VI.6.2 Scenario 2 
 
 In this scenario, an exogenous investment in sewerage is simulated much alike in the second 
scenario for electricity. Capital stock in the sector is augmented by US$ 300 million (2% of 
GDP). Since there is unsatisfied demand for sewerage in the country, it is expected that 
households are willing to absorb the increased supply of sewerage services without leading to 
price reductions. In order to simulate this change in the model, an increase in demand for 
sewerage services is assumed.  
 
VI.6.2.1 Simulation parameters 
 
An exogenous increase in capital stock in the water and sewerage sector is imposed. 
Simultaneously, demand for sewerage services is doubled.  
 
VI.6.2.2   Results with full employment (long – term) and fixed tax rates 
 
Given the estimated initial capital stock (approximately US$ 480 million), the projected 
investment leads to a 63% increase in the sectoral capital stock.
7 A 30% increase in sectoral 
labor use was also imposed. As a result, sectoral output grows by 44% (Table A2), while other 
sectors contract slightly (sectoral output variations in the other activities are lower than 1%). 
The reason for these slight effects on other sectors lies in the small relative size of the water 
and sewerage sector in the Uruguayan economy.  
 
Since water and sewerage services are a non – tradable sector, no direct effects on import and 
exports take place; minor effects on other sectors’ foreign trade are observed.  
 
No significant changes in macroeconomic aggregates are observed (Table A1). Fiscal deficit 
increases by more than 1% (Table A11). Households belonging to the first 8 income deciles 
                                                 
7 Due to the lack of relevant information, estimates of the initial stock of capital in this sector are particularly 
rough and the magnitude of the relative change must be interpreted with caution.   31
experience small welfare gains, while those belonging to the 9
th and 10
th deciles experience 
welfare losses.  
 
The most challenging aspect of this experiment was to conciliate an important resource 
reallocation towards a particular sector within a general equilibrium framework. The main 
difficulty was to adequately estimate the rise in demand needed to absorb such an important 
increase in supply. It was not possible to achieve a consistent aggregate result within the initial 
conditions of the model: absorption of the increased supply required unrealistic price 
decreases, and no optimal solutions could be found. A modification in the water and sewerage 
services consumption parameter was then introduced so as to capture the existing unsatisfied 
demand for sewerage, leading to small price variations. So an important increase in investment 
and supply can only be justified on the grounds of an important unsatisfied demand in the 
baseline scenario.  
 
VI.6.2.3 Alternative closure rules: short – term scenario and endogenous tax rates 
 
A small reduction in employment is achieved in the short run due to wage rigidity. Changes in 
employment levels of other activities are larger in the short – term, but still rather small. By 
assumption, labor wages remain constant in the short run, and capital rent becomes more rigid 
as well. Prices of other activities exhibit small variations, generally lower in the short than in 
the long – term scenario. 
 
A decrease in value added revenues is achieved in the long – term scenario with endogenous 
value – added tax rate. On the contrary, an increase in revenues is observed in the short – term 
scenario with endogenous tax rate. Since government savings is assumed exogenous, no 
significant variations on household welfare were observed. 
 
VII. CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
 
In this paper, we analyze the possible impacts of the reform of public services in Uruguay. We 
use a static CGE model in order to perform various comparative static exercises aiming at 
investigating the effects of regulatory reforms on macroeconomic variables and on different 
sectors and economic agents. Eleven alternative scenarios with 4 possible closure rules were 
examined, leading to 44 simulations. We did not intend to consider every possible scenario, 
but only the most relevant ones in view of the main objectives of this study. The model allows 
policy - makers and involved actors to explore possibilities for policy design and decision - 
making.  
 
Simulation results show that the macroeconomic effects of the reforms are generally small. 
Alternative closure rules do not determine significant variations in the results. However, it 
must be taken into account that CGE models tend to under - estimate global impacts of policy 
measures when working with competitive market structures. Therefore, results do not provide 
quantitative predictions and they should be interpreted with caution. Besides, results are very 
sensitive to the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported commodities and 
between domestic market and export sales. Since no estimated parameters values were 
available in Uruguay, they were taken from the literature; an accurate estimation of parameter 
values could improve the usefulness of the model.   32
 
Possible extensions of this work include: considering alternative closure rules such as sector - 
specific factors and different external balance closures leading to temporary changes in the 
productive specialization pattern of the Uruguayan economy, projecting changes in the 
productive structure of the economy and in demand functions, and improving baseline 
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Table A2 – Sectoral GDP at agents prices 
Long term scenario with fixed tax rates – percentage change relative to the initial 
equilibrium 
Electricity Fuel  Water and 













Gas  Tele –




Agriculture  -0.15  0.01 -0.08 0.64 1.02 0.94 -1.08  0.01  -0.27  -0.05 -0.59 
Cattle  raising  -0.05  0.02 -0.09 0.31 0.33 0.29 0.08  0.08  -0.42  -0.09 -0.74 
Forestry  -0.1  -0.34 -0.26 0.36 0.68 0.62 -0.39  0.05  -0.27  0.05 -0.48 
Other primary 
sectors  -0.21  -0.75 -0.43 0.31 0.57 0.51 -0.26  0.07  -0.15  0.11 -0.42 
Bovine  meat  -0.05  0.29 0.02 0.41 0.36 0.32 0.11  0.09  -0.48  -0.11  -0.75 
Dairy  industries  -0.07  0.06 -0.08 0.21  0.3  0.27 0.02  0.05  -0.45  -0.2 -0.83 
Rice and barley  -0.46  0.63  0.19  1.17  1.41  1.29  -1.58  0.08  -0.4  -0.1  -0.68 
Leather 
industries  0.23  3.25 1.28 2.24 0.21 0.06  1.5 0.70  -1.26  -0.61 -0.4 




-0.05 -1.93  -1.00  0.08  0.39  0.34  0.15  0.14  0.34  0.26  -0.28 
Ceramic and 
cement  -0.34  -1.61 -0.86 -0.09 0.41 0.37 -0.29  0.07  0.00  0.38 -0.15 
Export industries  -0.06  -2.8  -1.41  0.59  0.54  0.44  0.21  0.35  -0.5  0.28  -0.72 
Non - tradable 
sectors  -0.06 -0.45  -0.31  0.09  0.36  0.32  0.09  0.07  0.06  -0.02  -0.54 
Import  industries  -0.03  -0.5 -0.29 -0.22 0.22 0.18 0.09  -0.03  -0.33  0.08 -0.26 
Wholesale  trade  -0.06  -0.18 -0.19 -0.26 0.37 0.34 -0.02  -0.08  -0.14  -0.02 -0.44 
Retail trade  -0.06  -0.21  -0.2  0.06  0.38  0.36  0.02  -0.01  -0.21  -0.02  -0.49 
Hotels and 
restaurants  -0.09 -0.47  -0.34  -0.06  0.44  0.4  0.04  0.03  0.01  -0.16  -0.61 
Hospitals -0.10  -0.41  -0.3  -0.07  0.32  0.29  0.10  0.03  -0.10  -0.12  -0.65 
Other services  -0.04  -0.18  -0.16  -0.01  0.23  0.21  0.02  0.02  -0.06  -0.01  -0.26 
Construction  -0.02  -0.1 -0.08 -0.08 0.09 0.08 0.01  -0.01  0.02  0.02 -0.04 
Financial 
services  -0.09 -0.3  -0.26  -0.07  0.42  0.38  0.10  0.03 -0.14 -0.07  -0.44 
Refinery -0.08  -0.2  -0.21  -4.34  0.00  0.00  0.05  -1.17  -0.05  -0.23  -0.47 
Electric  energy  -0.04  18.08 8,00 1.07 -0.43 -0.38 0.46  -0.26  -1.63  -0.66 0.41 
Natural gas  -0.09  -0.51  -0.36  -1.04  0.6  0.52  0.03  11.86 -0.01  -0.15  -0.76 
Water and 
sewerage  -0.07 -1.28  -0.7  0.33  -0.27  -0.24  1.02  -0.16 -1.14  22.12  44.24 
Passenger 
transportation  -0.09 -0.17  -0.19  0.22  0.7  0.64  -0.55  0.01 -0.21  -0.09  -0.81 
Other 
transportation  0.12  0.22 -0.01 0.62 1.16 1.11 -1.14  -0.02  -0.21  -0.01 -0.23 
Railroad 
transportation  59.88  0.73 0.23 1.33 -0.08 -0.03 0.26  -0.56  -3.4  0.09 -0.43 
Tele-
communications  -0.07 -0.14  -0.18  -0.06  0.38  0.34  0.07  0.02  6.60  -0.02  -0.41 
Post -0.09  -0.78  -0.49  0,00  0.46  0.41  0.15  0.06  2.90  -0.05  -0.52 
                 






Table A3 – Sectoral labor use 
Long term scenario with fixed tax rates – percentage change relative to the initial 
equilibrium 
Electricity Fuel  Water and 


















Agriculture  -0.15  0.07 -0.04 0.59 0.81 0.75 -1.08  -0.01  -0.24  -0.06 -0.47 
Cattle  raising  -0.06  0.08 -0.05 0.27 0.13 0.11 0.08  0.06  -0.39  -0.1 -0.62 
Forestry  -0.10  -0.19 -0.14 0.26 0.14 0.13 -0.38  0.01  -0.20  0.02 -0.19 
Other primary 
sectors  -0.22  -0.63 -0.34 0.22 0.13 0.11 -0.25  0.04  -0.09  0.09 -0.17 
Bovine meat  -0.05  0.42  0.12  0.31  -0.10  -0.11  0.12  0.06  -0.42  -0.13  -0.49 
Dary industries  -0.07  0.16  0.00  0.13  -0.06  -0.06  0.02  0.02  -0.4  -0.22  -0.63 
Rice and barley  -0.46  0.74  0.27  1.09  1.01  0.93  -1.57  0.05  -0.35  -0.12  -0.46 
Leather 
industries  0.22 3.42  1.41  2.12  -0.37  -0.47  1.51  0.66 -1.18 -0.64  -0.07 




-0.05  -1.82 -0.91 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.16  0.11  0.39  0.24 -0.07 
Ceramic and 
cement  -0.34  -1.53 -0.79 -0.15 0.12 0.11 -0.28  0.05  0.04  0.37 0.01 
Export industries  -0.06  -2.69  -1.32  0.51  0.13  0.06  0.22  0.32  -0.45  0.26  -0.49 
Non - tradable 
sectors  -0.07 -0.36  -0.24  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.10  0.05  0.11  -0.04  -0.36 
Import industries  -0.03  -0.39  -0.2  -0.3  -0.18  -0.18  0.1  -0.06  -0.28  0.06  -0.04 
Wholesale  trade  -0.07  -0.08 -0.11 -0.33 0.01 0.01 -0.02  -0.1  -0.1  -0.04 -0.24 
Retail trade  -0.06  -0.13  -0.13  -0.01  0.07  0.08  0.02  -0.03  -0.17  -0.04  -0.32 
Hotels and 
restaurants  -0.1  -0.3  -0.21 -0.18 -0.16 -0.15 0.05  -0.01  0.09  -0.19 -0.27 
Hospitals -0.1  -0.4  -0.3  -0.07  0.29  0.26  0.1  0.02  -0.10  -0.12  -0.64 
Other services  -0.04  -0.14  -0.12  -0.04  0.08  0.07  0.03  0.01  -0.04  -0.02  -0.18 
Construction  -0.02  -0.03 -0.02 -0.13 -0.16 -0.15 0.01  -0.03  0.05  0.00  0.10 
Financial 
services  -0.09  -0.15 -0.14 -0.19 -0.13 -0.12 0.11  -0.01  -0.07  -0.09 -0.13 
Refinery  -0.08  -0.03 -0.08 -4.46 -15.9  -14.49 0.06  -1.21  0.03  -0.26 -0.13 
Electric  energy  -0.05  9.46 8.00 0.99 -0.84 -0.75 0.47  -0.28  -1.57  -0.68 0.64 
Natural gas  -0.09  -0.43  -0.29  -1.1  0.3  0.25  0.03  11.83 0.03  -0.17  -0.59 
Water and 








0.11  0.35 0.09 0.52 0.68 0.68 -1.13  -0.05  -0.15  -0.03 0.03 
Railroad 
transportation  33.23  0.81 0.29 1.27 -0.38 -0.3  0.27  -0.58  -3.37  0.07 -0.26 
Tele-
communications  -0.08  -0.03 -0.09 -0.15 -0.04 -0.04 0.08  -0.01  6.65  -0.04 -0.18 
Post -0.09  -0.66  -0.39  -0.09  0.02  0.01  0.16  0.03  2.96  -0.07  -0.27 
                 




Table A4 – Sectoral capital use 
Long term scenario with fixed tax rates – percentage change relative to the initial 
equilibrium 
Electricity Fuel  Water and 


















Agriculture -0.15  -0.12  -0.19  0.73  1.5  1.38  -1.09  0.04  -0.33  -0.03  -0.85 
Cattle  raising  -0.05  -0.11 -0.2 0.41 0.81 0.73 0.07  0.11  -0.48  -0.06  -1.00 
Forestry  -0.10  -0.38 -0.29  0.4  0.83 0.76 -0.39  0.06  -0.29  0.06 -0.57 
Other primary 
sectors  -0.21  -0.82 -0.49 0.36 0.82 0.74 -0.27  0.08  -0.18  0.12 -0.56 
Bovine meat  -0.05  0.23  -0.03  0.45  0.58  0.52  0.1  0.11  -0.50  -0.1  -0.87 
Dary  industries  -0.07  -0.03  -0.16 0.27 0.62 0.56 0.01  0.07  -0.49  -0.19  -1.01 
Rice and barley  -0.46  0.55  0.12  1.23  1.7  1.56  -1.58  0.1  -0.44  -0.09  -0.84 
Leather  industries  0.23  3.22 1.26 2.26 0.32 0.15 1.49  0.71  -1.27  -0.6 -0.46 




-0.04  -2.01  -1.06 0.14 0.69 0.61 0.14  0.16  0.30  0.27 -0.45 
Ceramic and 
cement  -0.34  -1.72 -0.94 -0.01 0.81 0.73 -0.29 0.1  -0.05  0.40 -0.37 
Export  industries  -0.06  -2.87  -1.47 0.65 0.81 0.69 0.21  0.37  -0.53  0.29 -0.87 
Non - tradable 
sectors  -0.06  -0.55  -0.39 0.16 0.70 0.63 0.08 0.1  0.02  0.00 -0.74 
Import  industries  -0.03  -0.58  -0.35  -0.16 0.50 0.44 0.08  -0.01  -0.37  0.09 -0.42 
Wholesale  trade -0.06 -0.27  -0.26  -0.19  0.70  0.64  -0.03  -0.05 -0.19  0.00  -0.62 
Retail  trade  -0.06  -0.32  -0.28 0.13 0.76 0.71 0.01  0.02  -0.26  0.00 -0.7 
Hotels and 
restaurants  -0.09  -0.49  -0.36  -0.04 0.52 0.47 0.04  0.04  0.00  -0.16  -0.65 
Hospitals  -0.09  -0.59  -0.45 0.07 0.97 0.89 0.08  0.07  -0.19  -0.09  -1.02 
Other  services  -0.04  -0.33  -0.28 0.1 0.77 0.7 0.01  0.05  -0.13  0.01  -0.56 
Construction  -0.02  -0.22  -0.17 0.01 0.52 0.47 0,00  0.01  -0.04  0.04 -0.28 
Financial  services  -0.08  -0.34 -0.29 -0.05 0.55  0.5  0.1  0.04  -0.16  -0.06 -0.51 
Refinery  -0.08 -0.22  -0.23  -4.33  -15.32  -13.95  0.05  -1.17 -0.06  -0.22  -0.51 
Electric  energy  -0.04  9.25 8.00 1.13 -0.16 -0.13 0.46  -0.24  -1.66  -0.65 0.26 
Natural  gas  -0.09  -0.62  -0.44  -0.96 0.99 0.87 0.02  11.88 -0.06  -0.14  -0.97 
Water and 








0.12  0.16 -0.06 0.66 1.37 1.31 -1.15  0,00  -0.24  0.00 -0.35 
Railroad 
transportation  33.24  0.62 0.14 1.41 0.31 0.32 0.26  -0.53  -3.45  0.11 -0.64 
Tele-
communications  -0.07  -0.22  -0.24  -0.01 0.64 0.59 0.06  0.03  6.56  -0.01  -0.56 
Post  -0.09  -0.85  -0.54 0.05 0.70 0.63 0.14  0.08  2.87  -0.04  -0.65 
                 




Table A5 - Exports 
Long term scenario with fixed tax rates – percentage change relative to the initial 
equilibrium 
Electricity Fuel  Water and 


















Agriculture  -0.14  0.46 0.13 1.48 1.99 1.85 -2.64  -0.04  -0.55  -0.04  -0.53 
Cattle  raising  -0.03  0.76 0.26 0.65 0.29 0.25 0.02  0.09  -0.86  -0.04  -0.64 
Forestry  -0.24  0.4  0.07 0.97 1.17 1.08 -0.89  0.05  -0.77  0.10 -0.54 
Other primary 
sectors  -0.60  -0.22 -0.19 1.04 1.22 1.11 -1.18  0.05  -0.14  0.15 -0.41 
Bovine  meat  -0.02  0.82 0.27 0.68 0.33 0.28 0.11  0.12  -0.72  -0.12  -0.68 
Dairy  products  -0.04  0.68 0.21 0.44  0.2  0.17 0,00  0.08  -0.73  -0.34  -0.71 
Rice and barley  -0.57  1,00  0.37  1.55  1.72  1.56  -2.07  0.1  -0.49  -0.11  -0.62 
Leather  products  0.27  4,00 1.61 2.55 0.18 0.01 1.70  0.78  -1.42  -0.72  -0.37 




-0.02 -3.47  -1.71  0.11  0.46  0.39  0.17  0.23  0.84  0.40  -0.26 
Ceramic and 
cement  -0.77  -3.82 -1.88 -0.19  0.5  0.44 -0.89  0.18  0.18  0.58 -0.12 
Exportable 
commodities  -0.05 -3.39  -1.68  0.75  0.59  0.47  0.25  0.43 -0.60  0.36  -0.7 
Non - tradable 
commodities  -0.04 -0.64  -0.39  0.25  0.35  0.3  0.15  0.13  0.22  0.04  -0.5 
Importable 
commodities  -0.03  -0.79 -0.42 -0.08 0.25  0.2  0.11  0.02  -0.42  0.14 -0.24 
Wholesale  trade  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Retail  trade  -0.03  0.49 0.14 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.49  0.03  -0.66  0.02 -0.43 
Hotels and 
restaurants  -0.07 -0.17  -0.21  0.06  0.41  0.36  0.21  0.09  0.18  -0.31  -0.58 
Hospitals  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Other services  -0.02  0.39  0.13  0.08  -0.10  -0.10  0.34  0.05  -0.19  -0.04  -0.12 
Construction  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Financial 
services  -0.06  0.41 0.05 0.07 0.35 0.30 0.61  0.09  -0.59  0.01 -0.52 
Gasoline -0.02  1.13  0.39  -11.67  1.54  15.5  -0.26  0.26  0.00  -0.71  -0.24 
Fuel  Oil  -0.08  -1.21 -0.69 -5.32 -0.01 -0.11 -12.2  -1.43  0.06  -0.24 -0.51 
Gas oil  -0.16  -0.2  -0.22  2.21  9.62  188.84  -12.36  -2.05  -0.03  -0.37  -0.51 
Other  fuels  -0.08  -0.09 -0.17 -4.68 0.01 0.01 -9.53  -1.28  -0.07  -0.25 -0.44 
Electric energy  -0.02  22.62  9.96  1.14  -0.43  -0.39  0.35  -0.19  -1.51  -0.85  0.5 
Argentinean 
natural gas  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 




0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Compressed 
natural gas for 
automobile use 
0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Water and 




-0.07  0.49 0.13 0.62 1.07 0.98 -1.35  0.01  -0.37  -0.10 -0.7 
Other 
transportation  0.13  0.77 0.24 1.38 2.11 1.99 -2.59  -0.05  -0.26  -0.10  -0.19  39
Electricity Fuel  Water and 




















transportation  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 
Tele-
communications  -0.05  0.12 -0.06 0.06 0.26 0.22 0.42  0.07  34.36  0.01 -0.40 
Post -0.07  -0.98  -0.58  0.11  0.44  0.39  0.36  0.12  6.68  -0.06  -0.50 
                 
TOTAL -0.05  -0.07  -0.14  0.62  0.57  0.65  -0.19  0.16  -0.09  -0.03  -0.48 
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Table A6 - Imports 
Long term scenario with fixed tax rates – percentage change relative to the initial 
equilibrium 
Electricity Fuel  Water and 


















Agriculture -0.16  -0.33  -0.25  -0.2  0.02  0.00  0.56  0.06  -0.02 -0.07  -0.64 
Cattle raising  -0.07  -0.55  -0.37  0.08  0.44  0.39  0.04  0.07  -0.04  -0.14  -0.82 
Forestry 0.12  -1.27  -0.67  -0.42  0.02  0.02  0.25  0.05  0.40  -0.04  -0.39 
Other primary 
sectors  0.22  -1.20 -0.64 -0.40 -0.07 -0.09 0.64 0.09  -0.20  0.05 -0.41 
Bovine meat  -0.11  -0.81  -0.51  -0.12  0.49  0.45  0.01  0.02  0.03  -0.09  -0.9 
Dairy  products  -0.12  -1.02 -0.6 -0.17 0.54  0.5  -0.04  -0.01  0.06  0.04 -1.05 
Rice and barley  0.07  -1.09  -0.63  -0.55  0.02  0.03  0.68  -0.02  0,00  -0.06  -0.94 
Leather  products  0.03 -0.04  -0.17  0.93  0.38  0.29  0.55  0.35 -0.54  -0.10  -0.54 




-0.08  0.16 -0.04 0.07 0.35 0.32 0.03  0.01  -0.30  0.06 -0.31 
Ceramic and 
cement  0.12  0.83 0.26 0.05 0.37 0.35 0.27  -0.04  -0.18  0.16 -0.18 
Exportable 
commodities  -0.10  -0.04 -0.14 -0.08 0.39 0.37 -0.05  -0.03  -0.02  -0.10 -0.80 
Non - tradable 
commodities  -0.09  -0.27 -0.24 -0.09 0.42 0.39 -0.08  -0.01  -0.09  -0.10 -0.60 
Importable 
commodities  -0.05  -0.17 -0.15 -0.55 0.21 0.19 -0.05  -0.14  -0.03  -0.05 -0.31 
Wholesale  trade  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Retail  trade  -0.10  -1.08 -0.6 -0.07 0.75 0.71 -0.57  -0.05  0.33  -0.07 -0.56 
Hotels and 
restaurants  -0.12  -0.81 -0.49 -0.19 0.48 0.45 -0.15  -0.03  -0.18  0.02 -0.64 
Hospitals  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Other  services  -0.07  -0.8 -0.47 -0.1  0.59 0.55 -0.32  -0.02  0.07  0.01 -0.41 
Construction  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Financial 
services  -0.12 -1.04  -0.59  -0.23  0.5  0.47  -0.42  -0.03 0.33  -0.14  -0.35 
Gasoline  -0.68  -11.85  -5.72 1072.42 346.56 363.38 -72.52  -15.05 -1.14  4.93  -2.76 
Fuel  Oil  -0.08  13.87  6.11 9.09 0.42 0.37 -0.94  2.09  -1.58  -0.13 0.19 
Gas  oil  0.79  0.78 0.35  44.07  14.72  21.82  -15.09  8.83  -0.57  1.30 0.06 
Other  fuels  -0.01  -0.45 -0.31 2.04  0.7  0.65 -4.02  0.54  -0.22  0.03 -0.83 
Electric  energy  -0.07  13.64 6.04 1.02 -0.42 -0.36 0.56  -0.32  -1.76  -0.48 0.32 
Argentinean 
natural gas  -0.09 -0.51  -0.36  -1.04  0.60  0.52  0.03  11,089 -0.01  -0.15  -0.76 




0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Compressed 
natural gas for 
automobile use 
0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Water and 




-0.12 -1.08  -0.63  -0.33  0.18  0.17  0.57  0.01  0.02  -0.06  -0.97 
Other 
transportation  0.10  -0.66 -0.42 -0.59 -0.36 -0.31 1.21 0.03  -0.12  0.13  -0.3  41
Electricity Fuel  Water and 




















transportation  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Tele-
communications  -0.08 -0.19  -0.2  -0.09  0.4  0.36  0.01  0.01  2.28  -0.03  -0.41 
Post  -0.12  -0.47 -0.34 -0.18 0.48 0.45 -0.17  -0.03  -2.81  -0.03 -0.55 
                 





Table A7 – Real exchange rates and factor wages 
Long term scenario with fixed tax rates – percentage change relative to the initial 
equilibrium 
Electricity Fuel  Water and 
sewerage    Railroad 




















0.00  0.60 0.30 0.20 010 0.10 -0.30  0.10  0.60  0.00 0.10 
Real labor 
wage  -0.01  -0.61 -0.32 -0.25 0.97  0.88 -0.87  0.14  1.20  -0.04 -0.22 
Capital 






Table A8 – Prices of composite commodities 
Long term scenario with fixed tax rates – percentage change relative to the initial 
equilibrium 
Electricity Fuel  Water and 


















Agriculture  0.01  0.08 0.04 -0.98  -0.71  -0.68 1.26  0.21  0.87  0.01 0,00 
Cattle  raising  -0.01  -0.32 -0.15 -0.54 0.30 0.26 -0.25  0.15  1.11  -0.03 -0.05 
Forestry  0.23  -0.51 -0.21 -1.00 -0.47 -0.45 0.41 0.16  1.31  -0.06 0.15 
Other primary 
sectors  0.42  -0.03 0.00 -0.90 -0.42 -0.41 0.64  0.18  0.59  -0.02 0.06 
Bovine  meat  -0.03  -0.41 -0.19 -0.62 0.28 0.25 -0.31  0.10  1.02  0.04 -0.06 
Dairy  products  -0.03  -0.46 -0.22 -0.53 0.38 0.34 -0.28  0.11  1.05  0.22 -0.12 
Rice and barley  0.34  -0.61  -0.29  -1.25  -0.63  -0.59  1.14  0.10  0.88  0.05  -0.11 
Leather  products  -0.07  -1.04 -0.45 -0.82 0.25 0.24 -0.63  0.00  0.97  0.25 -0.02 




0.00  1.23 0.57 -0.25 0.16 0.14 -0.26  0.11  0.39  -0.05 0.04 
Ceramic and 
cement  0.39  2.42 1.11 -0.13 0.15 0.13 0.23  0.06  0.49  -0.15 0.03 
Exportable 
commodities  0.00  1.32 0.61 -0.46 0.14 0.13 -0.32  0.03  0.80  -0.1  0.02 
Non - tradable 
commodities  0.00  0.48 0.22 -0.34 0.21 0.19 -0.31  0.11  0.57  -0.01 0.02 
Importable 
commodities  0.01 0.4  0.19  -0.3  0.18  0.15  -0.23  0.14  0.70 0.01  0.04 
Wholesale  trade  -0.01  -0.29 -0.13 -0.39 0.39 0.35 -0.55  0.12  1.03  0,00 0,00 
Retail  trade  -0.02  -0.44 -0.20 -0.33 0.58 0.53 -0.86  0.11  1.19  -0.02 -0.02 
Hotels and 
restaurants  -0.01  0.11 0.07 -0.35 0.22 0.20 -0.44  0.09  0.37  0.23 0.02 
Hospitals  -0.01  -0.33 -0.18 -0.27 0.75 0.68 -0.71  0.12  0.77  0.13 -0.19 
Other  services  -0.01  -0.22 -0.12 -0.31 0.60 0.54 -0.62  0.12  0.74  0.06 -0.12 
Construction  0.00  0.69 0.31 -0.36 0.26 0.23 -0.34 0.1  0.56  0.21 -0.09 
Financial 
services  -0.02  -0.40 -0.15 -0.39 0.28 0.25 -0.86  0.09  1.17  -0.06 0.17 
Gasoline  -0.05  -0.92 -0.41 8.34 -1.44 -1.10 0.03  -1.34  0.57  0.53 -0.19 
Fuel  Oil  0.02  1.45 0.69 0.77 0.21 0.17 17.3 0.4  0.49  0.04 0.10 
Gas  oil  0.09  0.47 0.24 -7.52  -9.28  -8.76  15.34  1.01  0.60  0.16 0.10 
Other  fuels  0.02  0.39 0.19 -0.05 0.19 0.16 16.23  0.21  0.64  0.04 0.04 
Electric  energy  -0.01  -3.91 -1.88 -0.25 0.19 0.17 -0.11  0.08  0.43  0.25 -0.04 
Argentinean 
natural gas  0.02  0.50 0.24 -0.20 0.18 0.15 -0.22  -40.42 0.59  0.03 0.06 




-0.03  0.12 0.06 4.12 -0.55 -0.39 -0.26  -32.4  0.04  0.45 -1.19 
Compressed 
natural gas for 
automobile use 
0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Water and 




-0.01  -0.34 -0.17 -0.71 -0.29 -0.28  0.8 0.16  0.79  0.05 -0.09 
Other 
transportation  0.01  -0.16 -0.07 -1.10 -0.95 -0.91 1.57 0.19  0.65  0.13  0.01 
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Electricity Fuel  Water and 




















transportation  -13.93  -0.42 -0.2 -0.56 0.21 0.18 -0.22  0.14  1.10  -0.01 -0.01 
Tele-
communications  -0.01  0.17 0.09 -0.35 0.33 0.30 -0.67  0.10  -24.99  -0.01 0.05 
Post  -0.01  0.79 0.37 -0.36 0.20 0.18 -0.51  0.08  -4.41  0.04 0.03 
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Table A9 – Prices of domestic commodities 
Long term scenario with fixed tax rates – percentage change relative to the initial 
equilibrium 
Electricity Fuel  Water and 













Gas  Tele- 




Agriculture 0.01  -0.01  0.00  -1.2  -0.97  -0.93  1.71  0.22  0.94 0.01  -0.01 
Cattle raising  -0.01  -0.32  -0.15  -0.54  0.3  0.26  -0.25  0.15  1.11  -0.03  -0.05 
Forestry  0.24  -0.53 -0.22 -1.02 -0.49 -0.47 0.43 0.16  1.33  -0.06 0.15 
Other primary 
sectors  0.51  -0.12 -0.05 -1.05 -0.56 -0.54 0.83 0.18  0.57  -0.03 0.06 
Bovine  meat  -0.03  -0.50 -0.24 -0.66 0.30 0.27 -0.32  0.10  1.06  0.04 -0.07 
Dairy  products  -0.03  -0.54 -0.25 -0.56 0.40 0.36 -0.28  0.11  1.09  0.24 -0.14 
Rice and barley  0.39  -0.76  -0.36  -1.41  -0.76  -0.71  1.35  0.09  0.91  0.06  -0.13 
Leather  products  -0.12  -1.85 -0.81 -1.14  0.3  0.31 -0.88  -0.08  1.15  0.38 -0.05 




-0.01  2.36 1.08 -0.25 0.16 0.14 -0.34  0.04  0.06  -0.15 0.03 
Ceramic and 
cement  0.51  3.07 1.40 -0.09 0.14 0.13 0.37  0.03  0.44  -0.21 0.02 
Exportable 
commodities  -0.01  2.26 1.04 -0.67 0.11 0.12 -0.43  -0.09  0.96  -0.22 -0.01 
Non - tradable 
commodities  -0.01  0.54 0.25 -0.41 0.25 0.22 -0.39  0.08  0.51  -0.04 -0.01 
Importable 
commodities  0.00  0.44 0.20 -0.48 0.20 0.18 -0.35  0.08  0.91  -0.05 0.01 
Wholesale  trade  -0.01  -0.29 -0.13 -0.39 0.39 0.35 -0.55  0.12  1.03  0.00 0.00 
Retail  trade  -0.02  -0.48 -0.22 -0.34 0.60 0.55 -0.89  0.11  1.21  -0.02 -0.02 
Hotels and 
restaurants  -0.01  0.10 0.06 -0.36 0.23 0.20 -0.45  0.09  0.36  0.23 0.02 
Hospitals  -0.01  -0.33 -0.18 -0.27 0.75 0.68 -0.71  0.12  0.77  0.13 -0.19 
Other  services  -0.01  -0.24 -0.13 -0.31 0.61 0.56 -0.63  0.12  0.75  0.06 -0.13 
Construction  0.00  0.69 0.31 -0.36 0.26 0.23 -0.34  0.10  0.56  0.21 -0.09 
Financial 
services  -0.02  -0.41 -0.16 -0.39 0.28 0.25 -0.86  0.09  1.17  -0.06 0.17 
Gasoline  -0.05  -0.93 -0.42 8.62 -1.36 -1.00 0.01  -1.35  0.57  0.53 -0.19 
Fuel  Oil  0.02  1.79  0.84 1.1 0.22  0.18  17.26  0.48  0.45  0.04  0.12 
Gas  oil  0.10  0.48 0.24 -7.02  -9.13  -8.53  15.15  1.13  0.59  0.18 0.10 
Other  fuels  0.02  0.37 0.18 0.39 0.24  0.2 15.68  0.33  0.62  0.05 0.01 
Electric  energy  -0.01  -4.15 -2,00 -0.26 0.19 0.17  -0.1 0.08  0.42  0.26 -0.05 
Argentinean 
natural gas  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 




-0.03  0.12 0.06 4.12 -0.55 -0.39 -0.26  -32.4  0.04  0.45 -1.19 
Compressed 
natural gas for 
automobile use 
0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Water and 




-0.01  -0.48 -0.24 -0.79 -0.37 -0.36 0.98 0.16  0.83  0.06 -0.11 
Other  0.00  -0.40 -0.17 -1.41 -1.34 -1.27 2.19 0.21  0.68  0.17 -0.01  46
Electricity Fuel  Water and 













Gas  Tele- 







transportation  -13.93  -0.42 -0.2 -0.56 0.21 0.18 -0.22  0.14  1.10  -0.01 -0.01 
Tele-
communications  -0.01  0.16 0.08 -0.36 0.33  0.3  -0.68  0.09  -25.71  -0.01 0.05 
Post  -0.02  0.83 0.39 -0.38  0.2  0.18 -0.55  0.07  -5.10  0.04 0.02 
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Table A10 – Prices of imported commodities 
Long term scenario with fixed tax rates – percentage change relative to the initial 
equilibrium 
Electricity Fuel  Water and 


















Agriculture  0.02  0.38 0.18 -0.25 0.17 0.13 -0.20  0.16  0.65  0.03 0.05 
Cattle  raising  0.01  0.38 0.18 -0.26 0.17 0.13 -0.20  0.16  0.65  0.03 0.05 
Forestry  0.02  0.40 0.19 -0.25 0.17 0.14 -0.20  0.16  0.64  0.03 0.05 
Other primary 
sectors  0.02  0.38 0.19 -0.25 0.17 0.13 -0.20  0.16  0.65  0.03 0.05 
Bovine  meat  0.02  0.39 0.19 -0.25 0.17 0.13 -0.20  0.16  0.64  0.03 0.05 
Dairy  products  0.02  0.39 0.19 -0.25 0.17 0.14 -0.20  0.16  0.64  0.03 0.05 
Rice  and  barley  0.02  0.39 0.19 -0.25 0.17 0.13 -0.20  0.16  0.64  0.03 0.05 
Leather  products  0.02  0.38 0.19 -0.25 0.17 0.13 -0.20  0.16  0.65  0.03 0.05 




0.02  0.39 0.19 -0.25 0.17 0.13 -0.20  0.16  0.64  0.03 0.05 
Ceramic and 
cement  0.02  0.40 0.19 -0.25 0.17 0.14 -0.20  0.16  0.64  0.03 0.05 
Exportable 
commodities  0.02  0.39 0.19 -0.25 0.17 0.14 -0.20  0.16  0.64  0.03 0.05 
Non - tradable 
commodities  0.02  0.39 0.19 -0.25 0.17 0.14 -0.20  0.16  0.64  0.03 0.05 
Importable 
commodities  0.02  0.39 0.19 -0.25 0.17 0.14 -0.20  0.16  0.64  0.03 0.05 
Wholesale  trade  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Retail  trade  0.02  0.50 0.24 -0.20 0.18 0.15 -0.22  0.16  0.59  0.03 0.06 
Hotels and 
restaurants  0.02  0.50 0.24 -0.20 0.18 0.15 -0.22  0.16  0.59  0.03 0.06 
Hospitals  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Other  services  0.02  0.50 0.24 -0.20 0.18 0.15 -0.22  0.16  0.59  0.03 0.06 
Construction  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Financial 
services  0.02  0.50 0.24 -0.20 0.18 0.15 -0.22  0.16  0.59  0.03 0.06 
Gasoline  0.01  0.31 0.15  -15.45  -15.06  -15.09  13.8  0.15  0.68  0.03 0.04 
Fuel  Oil  0.02  0.46 0.22 -0.22 0.18 0.14 17.42  0.16  0.61  0.03 0.05 
Gas  oil  0.02  0.39 0.19  -10.76  -10.38  -10.41  17.06  0.16  0.64  0.03 0.05 
Other  fuels  0.02  0.39 0.19 -0.25 0.17 0.13 16.5  0.16  0.64  0.03 0.05 
Electric  energy  0.02  0.50 0.24 -0.20 0.18 0.15 -0.22  0.16  0.59  0.03 0.06 
Argentinean 
natural gas  0.02  0.50 0.24 -0.2 0.18 0.15 -0.22  -40.43 0.59  0.03 0.06 




0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Compressed 
natural gas for 
automobile use 
0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Water and 




0.02  0.50 0.24 -0.20 0.18 0.15 -0.22  0.16  0.59  0.03 0.06 
Other  0.02  0.50 0.24 -0.20 0.18 0.15 -0.22  0.16  0.59  0.03 0.06  48
Electricity Fuel  Water and 





















transportation  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Tele-
communications  0.02  0.5  0.24 -0.20 0.18 0.15 -0.22  0.16  0.59  0.03 0.06 
Post  0.02  0.5  0.24 -0.20 0.18 0.15 -0.22  0.16  0.59  0.03 0.06 
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Table A11 – Government finances  
Long term scenario with fixed tax rates - percentage of GDP at market prices 
          
Electricity Fuel  Water and 
sewerage    Baseline 
data 
Railroad 

























5.31  5.31  5.31 5.31 5.31 5.30 5.30 5.28  5.31  5.36  5.31 5.32 
Direct taxes 
on factors  9.50  9.51  9.48 9.49 9.50 9.54 9.54 9.43  9.51  9.60  9.50 9.48 
Value added 
tax  4.29  4.29  4.32 4.32 4.28 4.29 4.29 4.74  4.28  4.35  4.28 4.27 
Activity 
taxes  1.26  1.21  1.30 1.18 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26  1.26  0.23  1.26 1.31 
Sales  tax 4.32  4.32  4.34 4.33 4.39 4.29 4.29 4.36  4.29  4.34  4.33 4.30 
Import  tax  3.56  3.56  3.59 3.58 3.52 3.52 3.52 3.65  3.57  3.57  3.56 3.55 
Export  tax  0.02  0.02  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02 0.02 
                   
Expenditure  28.26  28.22  28.36 28.24 28.28 28.22 28.22 28.75  28.24  27.48  28.26 28.25 
Government 




15.08  15.09  15.14 15.12 15.13 15.00 15.01 15.11  15.07  15.06  15.09 15.08 
Transfers to 
the rest of 
the world 




-1.26  -1.33  -1.25 -1.35 -1.29 -1.23 -1.24 -0.74  -1.27  -2.11  -1.28 -1.26 
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Table A12 –  Optimal expenditure and equivalent variation (in %)  

































1st  decile 382.96  -0.10  -0.45  -0.33 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.17  0.03 -0.75  0.16 -0.17 
2nd  decile 590.03  -0.10  -0.47  -0.33 0.11 0.37 0.34 0.02  0.04 -0.33  0.07 -0.12 
3rd  decile 768.46  -0.11  -0.55 -0.37 0.04 0.45 0.41 -0.04  0.05 -0.13  0.03 -0.12 
4th  decile 926.60  -0.09  -0.47  -0.33 0.09 0.35 0.32 0.03  0.02 0.17  0.00 -0.07 
5th  decile  1,111.56  -0.09  -0.49  -0.34 0.03 0.43 0.39 -0.06  0.03 0.16  -0.04  -0.04 
6th  decile 1,321.69  -0.09  -0.48 -0.33 -0.03 0.47  0.43 -0.05  0.04  0.33  -0.05 -0.05 
7th  decile 1,588.33  -0.09  -0.50 -0.34 -0.10 0.49  0.44 -0.02  0.07  0.27  -0.08 -0.05 
8th  decile  1,853.14  -0.11  -0.52  -0.38  -0.08 0.54 0.49 0.02  0.06 0.22  -0.10  -0.03 
9th decile  2,496.17  -0.10  -0.46  -0.34  -0.16  0.59  0.54  -0.15  0.06  0.24  -0.13  0.02 
10th decile  4,182.19  -0.11  -0.47  -0.34  -0.19  0.51  0.46  -0.12  0.06  0.12  -0.15  0.07 
                  




Table A13 –  Income distribution 
Long term scenario with fixed tax rates - percentage change relative to the initial 
equilibrium 
Baseline 
data  Electricity Fuel  Water and 
sewerage 
Households  (in millions 
of  US 
dollars) 
Railroad 



















1st  decile  386.67  -0.02  -0.33 -0.18 -0.18 0.42  0.38 -0.42  0.07 0.57  -0.04 -0.03 
2nd  decile  598.28  -0.02  -0.36 -0.18  -0.2  0.46  0.42 -0.51  0.08  0.7  -0.04 -0.04 
3rd  decile  779.89  -0.02  -0.39 -0.20  -0.2  0.54  0.49 -0.58  0.09  0.8  -0.04 -0.07 
4th  decile  944.65  -0.02  -0.40 -0.20 -0.23 0.50  0.45 -0.62  0.09 0.87  -0.04 -0.04 
5th  decile 1,145.49  -0.02  -0.40 -0.20 -0.24 0.50  0.45 -0.64  0.09  0.9  -0.04 -0.03 
6th  decile 1,375.95  -0.02  -0.43 -0.21 -0.24  0.54  0.49  -0.67  0.09 0.95  -0.04 -0.04 
7th  decile 1,649.45  -0.02  -0.45 -0.22 -0.24  0.60  0.54  -0.69  0.10 0.98  -0.04 -0.07 
8th  decile 2,035.79  -0.03  -0.46 -0.24 -0.25  0.59  0.53  -0.61  0.10 0.84  -0.05 -0.05 
9th  decile 2,734.49  -0.03  -0.45 -0.23 -0.27 0.53  0.48 -0.65  0.09  0.9  -0.05 -0.01 
10th  decile  5,150.78  -0.03  -0.46 -0.22 -0.31 0.45 0.41  -0.7  0.09  1.00  -0.06 0.05 
                   
TOTAL 16,801.46  -0.02  -0.44 -0.22 -0.26 0.51  0.46 -0.65  0.09 0.91  -0.05 -0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 